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ALLOCATING ADJUDICATIVE DECISION
MAKING AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE
TRIAL AND APPELLATE LEVELS: A
UNIFIED VIEW OF THE SCOPE OF
REVIEW, THE JUDGE/JURY QUESTION,
AND PROCEDURAL DISCRETION
MARTIN B. LouIst
Decisional authority is divided between trial level and appellate
level decision makers largely through the distinction between law and
fact. Trial level decision makers, including trial judges, juries, and
agencies, take primary responsibility for questions of fact; appellate
courts take primary responsibility for questions of law. It is over the
application of law to historical fact, or ultimate facts, that the two levels
vie for decisional power. Professor Louis reexamines the traditional dis-
tinctions in appellate review offindings of historical fact, of law, and of
ultimate fact and considers with particularity appellate treatment of ul-
timate fact issues. Concluding that the trial level is increasingly the re-
pository of authority over ultimate fact questions, Professor Louis
considers the way in which appellate courts may use their power over
questions of law to limit the trial level's power even over ultimate facts.
I. INTRODUCTION
In America appellate courts almost never decide cases de novo. Their pri-
mary function is to review for error determinations made at the trial level.' The
intensity with which they review assigned errors is called the scope of review and
is popularly governed by the familiar distinction between fact and law.2 This
dichotomy posits the existence of two kinds of trial level determinations: those
of fact, which ordinarily are reviewed narrowly and deferentially on appeal, and
those of law, which ordinarily are reviewed freely or independently on appeal.
3
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B. 1956, Princeton Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1959 and LL.M. 1965, Harvard University. The preparation of this Article was sup-
ported by a grant from the University of North Carolina Law Center and by Kenan Research Leave
from the University of North Carolina.
1. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.8, at 665 (3d ed. 1985).
2. See Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 58 HARv. L. REV. 70, 72 (1944); Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1867-71 (1966).
3. Stem, supra note 2, at 72.
A finding of historical fact has been defined as "the assertion that a phenomenon has happened
or is or will be happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect." L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546-48 (abridged student ed. 1965). Such find-
ings, which are sometimes called historical facts, tend to answer the simple questions of who did
what, when, where, how, why, or with what intent. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
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Hence, fact-finding is the special province of the trial level, law declaration is the
special province of the appellate level, and the distinction between fact and law
is the primary means by which the trial and appellate levels divide decisional
power between them.
4
These nicely compartmentalized separations of law from fact and trial level
functions from appellate functions belie more complex distinctions between the
categories. The final logical step in the adjudicative decisional process is the
application of the relevant general legal principles to the historical facts found.5
This process produces findings of ultimate fact, such as the determinations that
defendant's employee was negligent and was acting within the scope of his or her
employment. Ultimate facts, because they combine elements of law and fact, do
not fit nicely within the law/fact dichotomy. Nevertheless, an accommodation
has been achieved by classifying particular ultimate fact determinations as
"fact" or "law" and reviewing them accordingly.
The existence of different trial level fact finders further complicates the dis-
tinction between trial and appellate functions. Although appellate courts gener-
ally review findings of historical fact and most findings of ultimate fact
deferentially, traditionally the degree of deference has varied slightly depending
on whether the factual findings were made by a jury, an agency, or a trial judge.
6
Facially these slight variations in institutional deference are attributable to dif-
ferences in the judicially or statutorily defined scope of review7 and, therefore, in
COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985). For example, whether defendant drove his or her car through a
red light is a finding of historical fact.
Declarations of law are fact-free general principles that are applicable to all, or at least to many,
disputes and not simply to the one sub judice. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 374
(tent. ed. 1958); Weiner, supra note 2, at 1869. Thus, the duty defendant owes to plaintiff in operat-
ing his or her vehicle on a public street is a question of law. After the facts are found and the law
declared, the final step is to make findings of ultimate fact by applying the law to the historical facts.
For example, the determination that driving a vehicle through a red light constitutes negligence is a
finding of ultimate fact because it requires the application of law to facts. Hart and Sacks remind us
"that this three-fold process is not a simple step-one, step-two, step-three process. The law deter-
mines what facts are relevant while at the same time the facts determine what law is relevant." H.
HART & A. SACKS, supra, at 375. Although the definitions of the three processes are clear-fact-
finding involves no law, law declaration involves no facts, and law application involves a combina-
tion of the law and the facts-their application is sometimes difficult. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984); Monaghan, supra, at 232-35. For example,
in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
for independently reviewing a trial level finding of no discriminatory intent under a statute. The
Court held that this finding was a pure question of fact-whether defendant had an actual motive or
intent to discriminate-rather than, as the court of appeals had characterized it, the ultimate fact of
statutory intent. Id. at 283-88. Because this determination was a finding of fact, the appellate court
should not have reviewed it independently. Id. at 289-90.
4. Stem, supra note 2, at 93.
5. For a discussion of the relationship between law, facts, and ultimate facts, see id. at 72.
6. Id. at 72-89.
7. Findings of fact by trial judges may not be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous."
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Agency fact-findings may not be set aside if they are supported by "substan-
tial evidence." Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). Only the jury
standard is judicially rather than statutorily created. Although that standard sometimes is described
as a substantial evidence standard, Stem, supra note 2, at 73, more often today it is said that a fact
may be taken from the jury by directed verdict or binding instruction or that a jury's fact-finding
may be reversed on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if no reasonable or reason-
ing person could find the fact on the evidence presented. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 373-
74 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); Stem, supra note 2, at 73.
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part to considerations of legislative intent. The slight variations, however, are
also attributable to a number of historical, constitutional, institutional, and prac-
tical considerations.
8
In the period following the New Deal, courts and commentators carefully
examined these variations in institutional deference and their sources, primarily
from the administrative law perspective, because of the sudden proliferation of
and interest in federal administrative agencies and agency adjudication.9 During
the same period, courts dealt with three additional aspects of the scope of review
of agency adjudication. First, although federal courts typically reviewed ques-
tions of law freely, they decided at least sometimes to defer to agencies' general
construction of their governing statutes, an aberration which raised still unset-
tled questions concerning the source, occasion for, and scope of this deference.10
Second, federal courts concluded that agency applications of statutory law to the
facts of a particular adjudication should ordinarily be reviewed deferentially like
questions of historical fact.1 1 This conclusion reflected the analogous process in
the judicial context whereby questions of ultimate fact going to the merits ordi-
narily were denominated questions of fact for the jury and, therefore, reviewed
deferentially on appeal.1 2 Third, the federal courts identified a limited and ex-
tremely controversial group of ultimate facts as "jurisdictional" or "constitu-
tional" facts,' 3  which by virtue of that classification were reviewed
independently like questions of law. 
14
The intensive scrutiny of scope of review in the administrative law context
exposed some related questions in the area of appellate review of judicial pro-
ceedings that have come to the fore in recent years. For example, although the
doctrine of constitutional fact arose in the context of agency adjudication, today
it arises primarily in the judicial context,' 5 in which it raises some new and, until
8. For a discussion of the considerations bearing on the differing degrees of deference to find-
ings of trial judges, juries, and agencies, see infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text; see L. JAFFE,
supra note 3, at 595-618; Stem, supra note 2, at 80-89; Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-
Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1020, 1032-41 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 2, at 70-72. Judicial review of agency adjudicative determina-
tions is described either as statutory or nonstatutory and may be conducted by a trial or an appellate
court. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
917-37 (7th ed. 1979). To avoid unnecessary textual qualification, later references to review of
agency adjudication will refer to statutory review by appellate courts, which is the principal federal
model. See id. at 918.
10. E.g., Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Pittsdon Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaven-
tura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976); see infra text accompanying notes 41-42, 216-20.
11. The history of this development is reviewed in L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 546-64; and Stem,
supra note 2, at 95-109. The leading decisions were NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 11
(1944); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); and Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
12. Stern, supra note 2, at 110 ("probably most issues described as ultimate fact-of the appli-
cation of a general rule to particular circumstances-are left to the jury"); Weiner, supra note 2, at
1919.
13. Jurisdictional facts are facts fundamental to the existence of an agency's statutory jurisdic-
tion-for example, whether an act occurred in interstate commerce. Constitutional facts are facts
fundamental to the existence of a constitutional right-for example, whether a confession was co-
erced or a film was obscene. See infra notes 266-92 and accompanying text.
14. L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 624-33; see infra text accompanying notes 266-78.
15. Most constitutional fact cases today arise out of the Bill of Rights and deal with such
questions as whether a film is obscene under the first amendment or whether a confession is coerced
1986]
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recently, largely unexplored questions. 16 Further, the scrutiny of scope of re-
view concepts in the administrative law context led to an increase in the focus on
such concepts in the judicial context. The division of mixed law/fact questions
or ultimate facts between the jury and trial judge was traditionally articulated in
terms of the law/fact dichotomy, the seventh amendment,' 7 and the relative
capacities of the two rival decision makers to make these determinations.'
8
Largely unmentioned was the fact that the assignment of a particular mixed
law/fact question to the judge or to the jury automatically determines the scope
of review of that question on appeal. 19
under the fifth amendment. See Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact,"
47 N.C.L. REV. 311, 312-13 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Strong, Dilemmic Aspects]; Strong, The
Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv. 223, 240-42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Strong, Persistent Doctrine].
16. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984);
Monaghan, supra note 3. Until recently only Professor Strong's articles, cited supra note 15, closely
followed this judicial flourishing of the doctrine of constitutional fact.
17. The seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides the right of trial
by jury in the federal courts. The amendment's applicability to ultimate facts is discussed infra note
19.
18. Stern, supra note 2, at 111 ("[A]lthough juries generally apply the law to the facts, tile line
dividing matters to be treated as 'fact' and 'law' for purposes of a jury trial is drawn with an eye to
the relative advantages of having a particular matter determined by the court or the jury, rather than
upon the basis of a consistent analysis of the factual or legal nature of the issue."); Weiner, supra
note 2, at 1867, 1872.
19. Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal. 2d 600, 145 P.2d 1 (1944); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note
1, § 7.10, at 338. Determining both the judge/jury allocation and the scope of appellate review of
mixed fact/law questions in terms of the law/fact dichotomy may have begun as an historical acci-
dent, but this symmetrical approach properly remains the general rule today. The rule persists be-
cause the seventh amendment requires an appellate court to review facts found by juries deferentially
and because most ultimate facts are not sufficiently important either to take them from the jury or to
consume precious appellate time by reviewing them independently. See infra text accompanying
notes 140-45 (free review of ultimate facts would detract from the appellate law-declaring function
and would be inefficient).
Nevertheless, appellate courts have developed three alternative models whereby some mixed
law/fact questions can be taken from the jury and, regardless of their trial level assignment, can be
reviewed independently on appeal. In one, the constitutional fact model, an ultimate fact determina-
tive of a constitutional right may be found initially by a jury or other fact finder, but on appeal it is
reviewed freely like a question of law. E.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984) (actual malice determination in constitutional defamation cases); see also
infra notes 279-92 and accompanying text (discussing more fully the doctrine of constitutional fact).
In the second or "law" model, an ultimate fact analytically indistinguishable from others that are
treated like questions of fact is treated like a question of law at both the trial and appellate levels and,
therefore, is never decided by the jury and is freely reviewed on appeal. See infra notes 252-65 and
accompanying text (more detailed discussion of the "law" model). For example, although reason-
able care in the tort context is generally regarded as a question of fact for the jury, in the commercial
law context it is often treated as a question of law for the trial judge. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1876,
1895-1906. Actually, this "law" approach is merely another way of referring to the fundamental
judge/jury allocation question because most nonequitable mixed questions going to the merits are
classified as questions of fact for the jury; the trial judge decides questions that are classified as
"law." See Weiner, supra note 2, at 1871-76. In the third or equitable model, the trial judge replaces
the jury as the fact finder on claims and defenses classified as equitable. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S.
323 (1966) (bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, is free of seventh amendment requirements);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) (upholding as equitable
the denial of jury trial for a back pay award under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) ("The cases uphold congressional power to entrust
enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized court of equity free from
the strictures of the seventh amendment.").
All findings of fact by trial judges, whether at law or in equity, are subject to the "clearly
erroneous" test of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). This test or scope of review is somewhat less deferential
[Vol. 64
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Although the impact on the scope of review of the assignment of questions
of ultimate fact to the judge or the jury was not generally discussed, surely ap-
pellate courts were aware of the consequences and often took them into account
in reviewing the legal correctness of assigning a particular question to the judge
or jury.20 If this is so, then in effect appellate courts possess a power, albeit a
limited one, to review particular ultimate facts simply by classifying them as
questions of law rather than as questions of fact.2 1 This "classification" power
has additional counterparts. The classification of a mixed question as one of
jurisdictional or constitutional fact, 22 or, in the realm of procedure and evi-
dence, as a question of law rather than as a discretionary determination, 23 simi-
larly results in free appellate review. Moreover, as an alternative to using this
classification power, appellate courts can narrow or control trial level decisional
power over the remaining questions by changing or refining the applicable legal
rules. 24 Thus, the appellate courts potentially exercise considerable power over
the ultimate fact-findings of trial level decision makers.
Scope of review, therefore, is the principal means by which adjudicative
decisional power and responsibility are divided between the trial and appellate
levels.25 This Article begins with a reexamination of the traditional distinctions
than are the equivalent scopes of review applicable to the findings of juries and agencies. See infra
notes 49-61 and accompanying text. Moreover, some appellate courts maintain that trial judge find-
ings of ultimate fact are freely reviewable. See infra note 76. In recent years, however, the United
States Supreme Court has suggested that even ultimate fact-findings by trial judges are subject to the
"clearly erroneous" test. See infra note 77. Current efforts to take complex fact and mixed law/fact
questions from the jury by means of a complexity exception to the seventh amendment or through
the due process clause presumably would assign these questions to the trial judge, as is done under
the equitable model. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
All three models represent limited exceptions to or exclusions from the seventh amendment,
which preserves the right of jury trial as it was in 1791. Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1961). At that time ultimate facts going to the merits and not subject to one of these exceptions
generally were assigned to the jury. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1890-93, 1907-10. Therefore, they
became "facts" within the meaning and protection of the seventh amendment. Burcham v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 209 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1954); Weiner, supra note 2, at 1889-93. There are only two
possible evasions of the seventh amendment: the newly discovered "complexity exception," men-
tioned above, which would permit some jury questions too complex for laypersons to be decided by
the trial judge, as in the equity model; and the statutory repeal-reincarnation route, whereby a claim
or defense traditionally tried by a jury-like employer negligence-is abrogated and replaced by a
new but different statutory one-like workmen's compensation-which is also classified as legal,
equitable, or administrative. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (up-
holding statutory transfer of power to award back pay from the jury trial to agency adjudication);
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978) (declaring the expanded statutory defense of unconscionability a question
of law).
20. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 338.
21. See supra note 19.
22. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984); see also
infra notes 266-92 and accompanying text (introducing concepts of jurisdictional and constitutional
fact).
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part IV A.
25. Power is also divided between the trial and appellate levels along a time line that ordinarily
forbids appellate review until a final judgment has been entered at the trial level. See Federal Civil
Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Spring 1984) (a
general review of the final judgment rule and its exceptions in the judicial context); see also 3 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.01 (1958) (surveying the equivalent "exhaustion
doctrine" in the administrative law context). With rare exceptions appellate courts will not consider
errors not raised at the trial level or not properly appealed. Phillips, The Appellate Review Function:
1986]
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in the scope of review of questions of law, historical fact, and ultimate fact. This
reexamination finds that the major area of difficulty in determining the scope of
review has centered on ultimate facts, particularly on those going to the merits
of a particular case. With certain important, though relatively static, exceptions,
ultimate fact questions today are classified as questions of fact and are reviewed
deferentially on appeal, marking a shift in power towards the trial level. This
shift has tended to blur and contract the traditional distinctions made by appel-
late courts among the various fact finders. In the past few years even trial
judges, whose findings were traditionally reviewed less deferentially than those
of juries and agencies, have become beneficiaries of the shift.
26
This Article then examines the various possible reasons for the shifting of
power and the blurring of traditional distinctions and concludes that the driving
force is the litigation explosion. Crowded appellate dockets and the temporal
inability of appellate courts to immerse themselves in the record of every case
have necessitated deference to most trial level determinations having a substan-
tial factual component. 27 This Article next examines the power of appellate
courts over the law and the various ways that power may be employed to con-
trol, to direct, and occasionally to expropriate the trial level's power over ulti-
mate facts. This Article concludes with an examination of the significantly
different allocation of decisional power between the trial and appellate levels in
the realm of procedure and evidence.
II. REEXAMINATION OF THE LAW/FACT DICHOTOMY
A. The Bifurcated Approach
The most striking aspect of the division of decisional power is its almost
total bifurcation. Power is divided between the trial and appellate levels, review
is either narrow and deferential or broad and independent, and particular ques-
tions are assigned a scope of review by means of either the law/fact or the law/
discretion dichotomy.28 The appropriate scope of review for mixed law/fact
questions under this approach is not apparent. This third or intermediate type
of question might justify a third or intermediate scope of review. Instead, such
questions simply are classified either as law or fact in the substantive context and
as law or discretion in the procedural or evidentiary context and reviewed ac-
Scope of Reviews, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 1984). The identification of these exceptions,
which is part of the general concept of an appellate court's scope of review, deals with the issue of
what questions are open on appeal. The principal focus of this Article, however, is on the standard
used in reviewing those questions.
26. See infra notes 27 & 57.
27. The clearest expression of this practical reason is found in Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985). Holding that the "clearly erroneous" test of FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a) applies to a trial judge's findings of historical fact not resting on credibility determinations, the
Court stated: "Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of the fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of
judicial resources." Anderson, 105 S. Ct. at 1512. This argument is also applicable to the review of
ultimate facts found by trial judges. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).
28. Mixed questions going to the merits are subject to the law/fact categorization, The law/
discretion labels are used to classify mixed questions in the procedural or evidentiary context. See
infra Part V.
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cordingly.2 9 This approach does not eliminate or explicate the underlying prob-
lem of choosing an appropriate scope of review for those questions; the choice
simply is hidden within the classification process.
The process of classifying procedural and evidentiary mixed law/fact ques-
tions is very different from the seemingly analogous process of classifying sub-
stantive ones.30 Once the classification has been made, however, appellate
review of "fact" in the substantive context and of "discretion" in the procedural
context are remarkably alike. On appeal, the question is not whether the trial
level result is the better or best one but only whether it is a legally permissible
one. 31 Review, therefore, is limited to whether the applicable legal principles
were identified and applied correctly and whether the findings of ultimate fact
exceed the limits of reasonableness. 32 The answers to these questions constitute
declarations of law, which define the nature of the trial level determination and
set the outer limits for particular factual situations. Within these boundaries the
trial level decision maker's choice among the permissible alternatives is final.
Thus, fact-finding is a form of discretionary power, and the trial level function
can be described as the exercise of discretionary power 33 as defined by and
within the limits set by law.
Traditionally, appellate courts were much less likely to find an abuse of
discretion in the procedural or evidentiary context 34 than to reverse a trial level
finding of ultimate fact going to the merits.35 That is no longer true, or at least
as true. Appellate courts today more readily find abuses of procedural discre-
tion 36 and, in some substantive areas like personal injury, less readily overturn
29. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1874-76.
30. See infra notes 345-47 and accompanying text. Substantive mixed law/fact questions are
normally, almost presumptively, classified as questions of fact. See infra text accompanying notes
72-76. Procedural mixed law/fact questions are classified by an ad hoc process under which a higher
percentage of questions, particularly those tending to affect the outcome of the litigation, are classi-
fied as questions of law. See infra note 334.
31. See infra note 335.
32. See infra note 333.
33. See P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE
PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 170 (3d ed. 1983) ("Despite the system of accountability, a significant
range of discretion will be left either to the judge or to the jury to react to the proof one way or the
other for the purpose of deciding what transpired between the parties, and in applying the legal
standard 'good faith' to those events.").
34. Traditionally, appellate courts have held that a discretionary determination will not be re-
versed unless it amounts to an "abuse" of discretion. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
35. Louis, Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties), Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law,
45 N.C.L. REV. 823, 836-38 (1967). Questions of ultimate fact going to the merits ordinarily were
denominated questions of fact for the jury and, therefore, reviewed deferentially on appeal. See
supra note 12.
36. The trial court's discretion over an allegedly excessive award of damages was once regarded
as almost absolute, but after World War II, as jury verdicts grew ever larger, appellate courts sud-
denly assumed the power to review. See Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
Federal courts now also carefully review discretionary denials of leave to amend, Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), and grants of new trials on the ground that the verdict is against the clear
weight of the evidence, eg., Lind v. Schenley Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 90-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 835 (1960). State courts were once very reluctant to find almost any trial level abuse of proce-
dural discretion. E.g., Consolidated Vending Co. v. Turner, 267 N.C. 576, 148 S.E.2d 531 (1966).
Those now governed by a version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may shed some of this
reluctance and follow the federal lead.
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findings of ultimate fact 37 than they did a half century ago. Overall, appellate
review of the two discretionary functions is coalescing, and what differences re-
main perhaps are more statistical3 8 and atmospheric 39 than doctrinal.
B. The Law/Fact Dichotomy-Pure Fact and Law
The law/fact dichotomy does quite well in predicting how appellate courts
will review trial level determinations of "pure" law and "pure" or historical
fact.4° The only exception to free review of questions of law is in the area of
administrative law, in which appellate courts occasionally defer to agency decla-
rations of general legal principles.4 ' This exception, however, has been applied
principally to novel, narrow, or technical questions 42 and can be viewed, there-
fore, as a form of deference to an agency's expertise rather than as a specific or
inherent limitation on appellate power.
Trial level findings of "pure" or historical fact ordinarily are reviewed nar-
rowly and deferentially on appeal.4 3 There are two familiar exceptions to the
general rule: the asserted power of federal appellate courts to review indepen-
dently the historical fact basis of constitutional fact determinations 44 and the
assertion of many appellate courts that findings of fact by trial judges that are
not based on credibility determinations are subject to free review rather than to
limited review under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).4 5 The former exception, although often asserted, has rarely
been exercised, 46 and the United States Supreme Court47 and an amendment to
37. See Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L.
REV. 903, 924-27 (1971); Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rule and Standards in Design
Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521,
524 (1982).
38. See infra notes 59 & 159 and accompanying text.
39. Courts may feel a greater latitude or freedom to reverse in one situation than in another,
even though they cannot articulate the exact nature of the difference. Thus, just as courts sense but
cannot articulate the exact nature of the difference between "clearly erroneous" and "substantial
evidence," they also sense but cannot articulate differences in reviewing a trial judge's fact-finding
involving credibility considerations and a trial judge's fact-finding based on documentary evidence.
This is true even though both findings are subject to the "clearly erroneous" test of FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a). See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985).
40. For definitions and examples of law, fact, and ultimate fact, see supra note 3.
41. See eg. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (deference to administrative bulletin
suggesting guidelines for interpreting federal wage and hour laws).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 216-20.
43. See Stern, supra note 2, at 72.
44. See infra notes 279-92 and accompanying text; see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
562 (1958) (stating that although adequately supported state court findings of fact are not "this
Court's concern,. . . where the claim is that the prisoner's confession is the product of coercion we
are bound to make our own examination of the record to determine whether the claim is meritori-
ous"); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REy. 5, 115 (1960) ("Ordinarily, if the facts are in dispute, the Supreme Court accepts the
state courts' findings on the disputed facts, though it retains freedom to review the evidence and
reach different conclusions in appropriate cases."); Monaghan, supra note 3, at 254-59 (discussing
the assertion in some early constitutional fact cases that federal courts reviewing agency adjudica-
tions were entitled to hear new evidence or all the evidence and, therefore, to make independent
findings of historical fact).
45. E.g., Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1950).
46. Professor Strong's review of modem constitutional fact cases, Strong, Persistent Doctrine,
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Rule 52(a)4 8 have repudiated the latter.
In sum, appellate courts review almost all findings of historical fact deferen-
tially. There are, however, historical variations in deference towards findings of
fact by juries, trial judges, and agencies. The traditional understanding is that
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), which applies to review of trial
judges' findings of fact, is less deferential than is the substantial evidence stan-
dard of section 10(e) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,49 which ap-
plies to review of agency findings. Further, in recent times the substantial
evidence test for agencies has been regarded as somewhat less deferential than
the reasonable person standard applied by trial judges in ruling on motions for
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 50 These traditional
understandings may well be accurate today, but the differences in the degree of
deference toward the various fact finders are narrow and have narrowed even
more in recent years.5 1 Under all three standards,' appellate courts, as well as
trial judges reviewing jury determinations, must reverse findings that are not
supported by legally sufficient evidence 52 and ordinarily must affirm those find-
ings that are. Scope of review problems arise when the findings, though sup-
ported by legally sufficient evidence, are contrary to the great weight of the
evidence and appear to be clearly wrong, shocking, or unjust. Such findings may
be overturned under both the "clearly erroneous" test 53 and the administrative
law substantial evidence test.5 4 Although courts cannot reverse jury findings of
this type on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 55 they may set
aside such findings and order a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is
supra note 15, shows no clear cut instance of the reversal of an historical fact-finding. Instead, most
cases involve reversal with respect to the ultimate fact whether, for example, a confession was "co-
erced," id. at 249-61, or a film was "obscene," id. at 270-80.
47. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985).
48. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 5 (August 1983) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .. "). This amendment became effective on August
1, 1985. U.S.C.A., pamphlet No. 3, Sept. 1985, 585-86.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982) (court shall set aside findings "unsupported by substantial evi-
dence"). For a discussion of the differing appellate deference shown under the "clearly erroneous"
and substantial evidence standards, see Stem, supra note 2, at 80-89.
50. At one time this reasonable person standard was considered equivalent to the substantial
evidence test for review of facts found by agencies. See, eg. Stern, supra note 2, at 72-79. Indeed,
the two phrases were often used interchangeably. NLRB v. Columbian Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299-300
(1939). After World War II, however, the Supreme Court decided that substantial evidence must be
found "on the whole record." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 481-91 (1951). As a
result the administrative standard diverged from the jury standard and is now somewhat less defer-
ential. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55; supra note 7.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12; infra note 77.
52. See, eg., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
53. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585, at 735 (1971);
Stem, supra note 2, at 89. The usual formulation is that "[a] finding is 'clearly 'erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
54. E.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951).
55. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 340-41; Stem, supra note 2, at 89.
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against the clear weight of the evidence. 5 6
The differences, if any, in the weights of evidence required by the three
standards for reversal are slight and incapable of precise articulation. Conse-
quently, an appellate court determined to reverse or set aside a particular factual
finding probably will not be deterred by the greater deference that theoretically
must be shown to particular fact finders.57 Perhaps statistical or other empirical
evidence would confirm the widely held impression 8 that trial judge findings
overall are the most vulnerable to appellate reversal, but even that conclusion
would have to be discounted somewhat by the recent efforts of the United States
Supreme Court to protect the findings of trial judges.59 Moreover, such empiri-
cal evidence might also confirm the suspicion that the findings of individual trial
judges and agencies with a reputation for bias or general untrustworthiness are
perhaps the most vulnerable of all.60 Finally, in the face of questionable find-
ings, reviewing courts sometimes seem to look for other errors permitting rever-
sal. Perhaps the easiest way to set aside a dubious jury verdict is to find an
evidentiary or instructional error.
61
In sum, the differences among the three scopes of review are narrow and
probably cannot even be expressed doctrinally. Although these differences prob-
ably can be demonstrated empirically and obviously can be expressed in terms of
the reasons and policies that purport to justify them,62 in practice they are prin-
cipally atmospheric 63 and operate like the proverbial thumb on the scale.
C. The Application of Law to Fact
The process of law application deals with those intermediate adjudicative
determinations that combine elements of fact and law and are variously known
as ultimate facts, applications of law to fact, or mixed questions of fact and
law. 64 Because there is no recognized intermediate scope of review, on appeal
these mixed determinations must be reviewed either narrowly like questions of
fact or broadly like questions of law. Even though ultimate facts are neither fact
nor law, 65 courts have misleadingly persisted in expressing the treatment of ulti-
56. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 359 (4th Cir. 1941).
57. Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780
(1975) (suggesting that reviewing courts do as they please and that the "rules governing judicial
review have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape").
58. Stem, supra note 2, at 80-89.
59. E.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985) ("clearly erroneous"
test applies to findings not resting on credibility determinations); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855-59 (1982) (reinstating trial court's findings not found to be
clearly erroneous); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1982) (holding that intent is a
question of fact subject to the "clearly erroneous" test).
60. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
61. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MIcH. L. REv.
68, 94 (1981).
62. See Stem, supra note 2, at 72-89 (comparing the application of these standards historically
and in terms of their policy considerations).
63. See supra note 39.
64. See Stem, supra note 2, at 93-120.
65. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 1872-76 (suggesting that in disputes over mixed questions, the
essential issue is whether the case is for the judge or the jury).
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mate facts in terms of the law/fact dichotomy. It must be understood, however,
that the expression reveals only the choice and not the reasons for it. More is at
stake, however, than deception and obfuscation. Ultimate facts constitute, as
their name implies, the final steps in the decisional process. Whether they are
reviewed narrowly or freely will determine ab initio whether principal responsi-
bility for their determination, and often for the outcome of the litigation, lies
with the trial or the appellate level. Moreover, because the two levels have
otherwise divided decisional power over pure fact and law in relatively fixed and
static terms, their inevitable struggle for power must center on the process of law
application and in particular on the scope of review of mixed law/fact questions.
Not surprisingly, the division of power over mixed questions has been
neither simple nor consistent, even though the process of law application itself
does not vary from one context or venue to another. To determine whether a
party was an "employee,"' 66 whether the employee acted within the "scope or
course of employment,"'67 whether a reporter acted with "actual malice,"'6
whether a confession was "coerced," ' 69 or whether an amendment or counter-
claim arose out of the same "transaction or occurrence,"' 70 trial level decision
makers must apply the applicable general principles of law to the historical facts.
The analytical similarity in making these determinations suggests that if they are
challenged on appeal the scope of review ought to be the same. That has not
been the case, however. Distinctions have been drawn among the types of mixed
questions presented for review7 1 and among the determinations of different trial
level decision makers. The overall results are approximately as follows:
1. Ultimate facts going to the merits are usually reviewed narrowly and
deferentially like questions of historical fact 72 even when the underlying histori-
cal facts are not in dispute.7 3 Indeed, with the exception of a few specific sub-
66. E.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
67. E.g., O'Keefe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
68. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. E.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
70. E.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574 (1945); Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
71. See Monaghan, supra note 3, at 232-35.
72. For administrative law purposes, what scope of review applies to ultimate facts going to the
merits'was effectively settled in the 1940s. See, eg., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111,
130-32 (1944); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1943); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,
411 (1941). One commentator has written that "the administrative judgment is to be treated in the
same way as a finding of fact." Stem, supra note 2, at 99.
73. The United States Supreme Court has often said that courts must defer to the ultimate fact-
findings of juries, even though the underlying historical facts are not in dispute. See, eg., Best v.
District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934); Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
657, 663-64 (1873). Nevertheless, some courts of appeal still say that if the historical facts are not in
dispute, the ultimate fact is a question of law. See, eg., Carman v. Harrison, 362 F.2d 694, 698 (8th
Cir. 1966); Burriss v. Texaco, Inc., 361 F.2d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1966). The basis for this contrary
view is the belief that law application is a judgmental process for which juries have no inherent
advantage over appellate courts. Those who propound this view emphasize that deference is typi-
cally paid to findings of both historical and ultimate fact because both are usually concealed within
the general verdict and because special procedures to separate them are very complex. When there
are no historical facts in issue, however, there is no need to defer to the jury's ultimate fact-findings.
This view asserts by implication the dubious proposition that appellate reexamination of a jury's
ultimate fact-findings would never violate the seventh amendment. See supra note 19. It also ig-
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stantive areas like constitutional 74 and contract or commercial law, 75 mixed
questions going to the merits are almost presumptively classified as questions of
fact, assigned to the jury, and reviewed narrowly on appeal from any fact finder.
There is one general exception. In some state and federal courts the ultimate
fact determinations of trial judges are subject to independent appellate review.
76
In a series of recent decisions, however, the United States Supreme Court has
moved strongly in the opposite direction and may be prepared to hold that the
ultimate fact-findings of federal trial judges are ordinarily subject to the "clearly
erroneous" test of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
7 7
2. Historically, some ultimate facts going to the merits have been re-
garded as too sensitive or too important to be entrusted to juries. These facts
have been denominated by courts or legislatures as questions of "law," taken
from the jury, and subjected to free review on appeal. 78 Similarly, some mixed
questions of a statutory or constitutional nature, including procedural questions,
have been regarded as too important to be entrusted to the discretion of any trial
level decision maker. These have been designated jurisdictional or constitutional
facts and subjected to free appellate review even when they have been deter-
mined initially by a jury.79 The doctrine of constitutional fact is flourishing
today, but the doctrine of jurisdictional fact has virtually disappeared from the
federal courts.80
3. Procedural or evidentiary mixed questions that are classified as "discre-
tionary" are subject to a narrow scope of review;81 those labeled "questions of
nores the view that the jury's knowledge of ordinary life gives it an advantage over judges in resolv-
ing many ultimate facts like negligence. See Sioux City & Pac. R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 664.
74. In the constitutional law area, ultimate facts may be classified as "constitutional facts" and
thereby reviewed independently on appeal. See supra note 19.
75. The desire for stability, predictability, and consistency of result apparently has persuaded
many courts to classify many mixed contract or commercial law questions as "legal." See Weiner,
supra note 2, at 1895-1906. In this way, appellate courts may exercise independent review.
76. Despite apparently contrary messages from the United States Supreme Court, e.g., Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1981); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291-92
(1960); McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954), approximately half the federal courts of
appeals, following the leadership of the Second Circuit, assert the power to review trial judge find-
ings of ultimate fact independently rather than under the "clearly erroneous" standard of FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a). E.g., Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S.S. Lines, 360 F.2d 774, 776-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 835 (1966). For a general review of the problem, see Stem, supra note 2, at 112-20; Weiner,
supra note 8, at 1022 (discussion of the split among the circuits and the rationale for each position);
see also infra note 146 (citing additional cases). These courts have concluded that trial judges have
no decisional advantage in finding ultimate facts. Moreover, trial judge findings of ultimate fact,
unlike ultimate fact-finding by juries, see supra note 73, may be easily separated from findings of
historical fact, to which the "clearly erroneous" standard applies.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("clearly erroneous" standard). In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of the United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959-60 (1984), the Supreme Court stated that the
"clearly erroneous" standard of "Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those described as
'ultimate facts' because they may determine the outcome of litigation." This statement, however,
apparently is not yet regarded as the definitive resolution of the question, even though it is consistent
with other Supreme Court decisions strengthening the position of trial judges. See also cases cited
supra note 59 (other applications of the "clearly erroneous" test).
78. See supra note 19.
79. See supra note 19; infra Part IV C.
80. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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law" are subject to a free one. Unlike questions going to the merits, however,
there is no implied presumption favoring narrow review of such mixed ques-
tions. Instead an ad hoe classification decision is made for each type of mixed
procedural question. Although the decision is rarely explained or justified, it
appears to be the result of a number of substantive considerations. 8 2 Not sur-
prisingly, this ad hoc process for classifying ultimate procedural facts achieves
different results from the presumptive process employed in the realm of sub-
stantive law. Whereas the application of substantive law to historical facts is
generally regarded as a discretionary trial level function, the analytically similar
application of procedural rules to historical facts is more likely to be regarded as
ultimately an appellate function, especially if the procedural question may affect
the case's outcome or the existence of an important procedural right.
83
4. Through their power to declare rules of law, to reject specific trial level
law-applying determinations as unreasonable, and to classify mixed questions as
"legal" or as questions of constitutional or jurisdictional fact, appellate courts
are able to limit, direct, or even expropriate the power of fact finders over partic-
ular ultimate facts. Each of these appellate powers is to some extent an alterna-
tive to the others, and all of them are alternatives to a general enlargement of the
role of appellate courts over the law application process.
84
The process of law application provides the principal battleground upon
which trial level decision makers and appellate courts vie for decisional power
and suggests that in the past half century, at least with respect to questions going
to the merits, trial level decision makers have won the battle. In the 1950s the
United States Supreme Court confirmed the presumptive hegemony of agencies
over the process of law application, a status already enjoyed by juries,8 5 and
today the Court is moving in the direction of giving greater deference to the
ultimate fact-findings of trial judges.8 6 Concurrently, the exceptions to this pre-
sumptive trial level hegemony either have shrunk or have remained relatively
constant. Thus, in the federal courts the doctrine of jurisdictional fact has virtu-
ally vanished;8 7 only occasionally do legislatures and courts classify new, mixed
law/fact questions as questions of law,8 8 and in a few sensitive, substantive law
areas like contract law the role of the fact finder may be growing.8 9 The doc-
trine of constitutional fact is the only expanding exception to trial level hegem-
ony over law application, but its expansion seems attributable principally to
substantive constitutional considerations rather than to any general desire for
82. See infra Part V.
83. See infra Part V.
84. See infra Part IV A.
85. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 59 & 76-77 and accompanying text.
87. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 261-64.
89. See Monaghan, supra note 3, at 232 n.21 (tracing the tension between the early principal
that construction of writings is for the trial judge and the emerging principle that construction of a
contract on the intent of the parties thereto is a question of fact); infra note 264.
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appellate decisional authority. 90 Finally, there is no evidence that appellate
courts are using their lawmaking power to compensate for this allocational shift
in power towards the trial level. Indeed, in the past few decades they have been
increasingly hesitant, particularly in negligence cases, even to hold that particu-
lar trial level findings of ultimate fact have exceeded the limits of reasonable-
ness.9 1 Thus, except for constitutional law, an area in which incorrect results
are less acceptable, 92 and a few substantive law areas like contract and commer-
cial law, in which stability, predictability, and consistency of result are highly
desirable, 93 questions of ultimate fact going to the merits presumptively fall
within the discretionary power of the trial level decision maker. Increasingly,
the trial on the merits is "the 'main event' . . . rather than a tryout on the
road."
94
Along with the growth in the power and responsibility of the trial level,
there has been a corresponding redefinition of the appellate role. Appellate
courts exercise two principal, overlapping functions: they declare the law and
they supervise the results of lower level adjudication in individual cases.9 5 At
one time appellate judges may have viewed themselves as the guarantors of cor-
rect or at least acceptable results in all cases appealed to them and may have
employed their powers, particularly their supervisory power, to achieve that
end. Today, appellate judges lack the time to participate so actively in every
case96 and therefore must be content merely to prevent egregious or outrageous
results. 97 Obviously, time constraints do not bar them from taking a harder
look at important cases or at cases in which the trial level decision or decision
maker for some reason is suspect. But the inability of appellate courts to scruti-
nize every case carefully is the principal reason for the growing power of the
trial level over the merits of a case and for the growing tendency of appellate
courts to treat all trial level decision makers essentially alike.
To explore these crucial conclusions, this Article turns now to a fuller ex-
amination of the reasons for the present triumph of the trial level over the law
application process. It will then examine the lawmaking powers of the appellate
courts and the ways in which these powers are or may be used to define, to limit,
and occasionally to preempt the growing discretionary power of the trial level.
Finally, this Article will explore the different balance of appellate and trial level
90. For discussions of constitutional considerations, see Monaghan, supra note 3; Strong,
Dilemmic Aspects, supra note 15; Strong, Persistent Doctrine, supra note 15.
91. James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 687-88 (1949).
92. See infra Part IV C.
93. See Thayer, "Law" and "Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 HARv. L. REV. 147, 160-61 (1890); Wei-
ner, supra note 2, at 1900-06; infra Part IV C.
94. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985) (quoting Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).
95. See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING To COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.13 commentary at 33-35
(1974).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 140-44.
97. R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE 130-31 (1973) (suggesting
that the law explosion leads to "an insistence that the best job possible be done at the (trial] stage




power prevailing in the area of procedure and evidence in which, under the aegis
of the law/discretion dichotomy, appellate courts maintain a higher level of
control.
III. EXPLORING THE SHIFr OF DECISIONAL POWER
TOWARDS THE TRIAL LEVEL
Because fact finders today have principal responsibility for applying the law
to the facts on issues going to the merits, they tend to control the outcome of
cases and to decide who or what falls within the meaning of most statutory
terms.98 Moreover, because fact-finding power is discretionary, different out-
comes in the application of legal principles to identical facts are not necessarily
grounds for reversal. 9 9 Given these consequences, the reasons for the trial
level's accretion of power are of great interest and importance.
First, the shift of power to the trial level is not the outcome of the once
heated debate over whether ultimate facts are analytically closer to "pure" ques-
tions of fact or of law. °0 That inquiry, which was wisely abandoned some years
ago, probably produced more heat than light. Unfortunately, judge/jury and
scope of review questions often are still resolved in these simplistic, obviously
inadequate terms,1 0 1 even though the following suggested approach is superior:
Clarity of thought is not advanced by debating whether law applica-
tion is lawmaking or fact-finding, as commentators have done. More-
over, it is meaningless to assign the task in a specific case to judge or
jury simply by use of the law and fact jargon, as courts have done. A
far preferable solution would be to recognize a third category [i.e., law
application] and to deal with it as such, not on the basis of terminol-
ogy, but on the basis of policy.
1 0 2
Second, the modem result has not been imposed exogenously by legislative
or constitutional command. Procedural statutes like the Federal Rules of Civil
98. E.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill (1944) (determining who is an "em-
ployee" within the meaning of federal labor laws for collective bargaining purposes); see also supra
notes 67 & 70 and accompanying text (examples of ultimate facts in the context of statutory terms).
99. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 3, at 1345; Weiner, supra note 2, at 1924. Courts may, of
course, set aside internally inconsistent jury verdicts. See, eg., Lansburgh & Bro. v. Clark, 127 F.2d
331, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Unlike juries, agencies and trial judges generally are expected to be
consistent in applying the law to the facts. See Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue
Service to be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV. 411, 412-14 (1985). Their determinations are usually so
fact specific, however, that inconsistency can often be passed off as fact distinctiveness. Some incon-
sistency is also inevitable if different trial or administrative law judges try like or similar cases or if
different panels of appellate judges review the results. Increasingly the use of nonmutual collateral
estoppel is foreclosing the relitigation of ultimate facts and thereby eliminating the possibility of
inconsistent findings. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
100. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 1876.
101, E.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310-11, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-47 (1975) (application of a
statutory term to facts designated as a "question of law" and taken from the jury). But see Artvale,
Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 363 F.2d 1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1966) (suggesting that the law/fact di-
chotomy is "too simplistic").
102. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1876; accord Monaghan, supra note 3, at 236-38; Schotland, Scope
of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks Before the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, Mar. 18,
1974, 34 FED. B.J. 54, 58 (1975).
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Procedure 0 3 and the Administrative Procedure Act'0 4 do not directly address
the allocation of authority over ultimate fact questions. The organic statutes of
most federal agencies are similarly silent, but they may impliedly confer grants
of discretionary power over all or most mixed questions within the assigned ad-
judicative jurisdiction.10 5 Otherwise these agencies would have primary respon-
sibility only for historical fact-findings 006-- a waste of their supposed expertise.
This theory of implied statutory power has both precedent t0 7 and logic behind
it. It is a relatively modem theory, however, which was not specifically articu-
lated in earlier judicial decisions supposedly closer in time and understanding to
the original congressional view of the administrative process.108 Although the
theory offers a persuasive modem justification for discretionary administrative
power over the process of law application, especially with respect to the newest
agencies,10 9 it cannot be regarded as the sole or original source of such agency
power.
Similarly, the jury's present hegemony over the process of law application
cannot be attributed principally to the seventh amendment, 110 which has never
been construed to require the automatic submission to the jury of all debatable
103. Although FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) preserves the right to jury trial as declared by the seventh
amendment, the Federal Rules otherwise are silent on these allocation questions.
104. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). See generally L. JAFFE,
supra note 3, at 569-70 (discussing the judicial power of review of administrative actions under the
Administrative Procedure Act).
105. L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 572-73 (rule making or order issuing agencies with specialized
jurisdiction are presumptively intended by Congress to have a policy making function and to exercise
discretion over the law application process); Stern, supra note 2, at 100, 105-07 (creation of a special
agency with authority to decide a matter manifests a legislative intention that the agency, and not a
court, decide that matter). The contention is especially strong if the agency has concurrent rule
making authority with which to overturn an independent judicial determination that was substituted
for the agency's original adjudicative determination.
106. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,411-12 (1941); United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 235 U.S.
314, 320-21 (1914).
107. See cases cited supra note 106; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
108. Compare, eg., FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920) ("It is for the courts, not the com-
mission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what [the words 'unfair method of competition']
include."), with FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) ("While this Court has de-
clared that it is for the courts to determine what practices or methods of competition are. . . unfair,
• . . in passing on that question the determination of the Commission is of weight."); FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) ("[L]egislative and judicial authorities alike convince us
that the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if,. . . it, like a court
of equity, considers values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit
of the antitrust laws."). These decisions show that appellate deference to the FTC's definition of the
statutory term "unfair methods of competition" has developed over time and was not an original
phenomenon.
109. Congressional awareness of the wide discretion courts now grant agencies over the process
of law application is presumably strong evidence of an intent to grant such decisional power to newly
created adjudicative agencies. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-98 (1979)
(congressional awareness that for many years federal courts would readily imply private remedies for
violations of regulatory legislation is a factor in discerning congressional intent with respect to legis-
lation enacted during that period).
110. In [s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any [c]ourt of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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mixed questions going to the merits.'11 Indeed, on several occasions the United
States Supreme Court has eschewed the opportunity to so hold and has said only
that assignment of mixed questions to the judge or jury is subject to the influ-
ence, but not necessarily the command, of the seventh amendment.' 12 This is
not to deny that many ultimate facts are "facts" within the meaning of the sev-
enth amendment" 13 and therefore in theory cannot be taken from the jury. But
some reassignment of ultimate fact questions to trial judges and agencies is con-
stitutionally possible, at least by indirect methods,' 14 and many mixed questions
fall into categories that have not traditionally been regarded as seventh-amend-
ment-protected jury questions. 1 5 Moreover, although most mixed questions
arising from newly created statutory claims and defenses are presumptively as-
signed to the jury, those placed by legislatures or courts within certain exempted
classifications are not so assigned, apparently without violation of the seventh
amendment. 116 These exceptions, whose scope and justifications will be dis-
111. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-39 (1958) (right to jury trial in
diversity case resolved under Erie doctrine rather than under seventh amendment).
112. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-39 (1958), the question
presented was, whether a federal court in diversity was bound by a state decision that a particular
mixed question was one of law for the court. That question was easily answered in the negative if the
seventh amendment, which applies to diversity cases, Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S.
364, 376-77 (1913), makes ultimate facts, like historic facts, jury questions in all cases at law. The
Court specifically declined to answer the question in those terms and held that the seventh amend-
ment exerts only an "influence." Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 n.10. Subsequently, in Simler v. Conner, 372
U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam), the Court held that federal law determines whether a state-
created right is equitable or legal for purposes of ruling on a demand for jury trial in federal court.
The Court further stated that federal law decides all such right to jury trial questions. Id. The
Court, however, did not find the seventh amendment automatically applicable to all mixed questions
going to the merits. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 1920 n.265.
113. See supra note 19.
114. See supra note 19 (describing the process whereby claims or defenses triable to a jury may
be statutorily repealed and replaced by new ones classified as legal, equitable, or administrative and,
therefore, not tried by juries). Bald legislative attempts to circumvent the seventh amendment by
simply codifying claims and defenses historically triable to a jury would presumably be met by
strong claims of unconstitutionality. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (declaring Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional on analogous Article III grounds for
transferring Article III jurisdiction to Article I bankruptcy court). No court, however, has yet held
that an act of Congress employing this repeal-reenactment process is invalid on seventh amendment
grounds. Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE
L.J. 401, 414-15 (1973).
115. These traditional categories include ultimate facts classified as questions of law, as questions
of constitutional fact, and as equitable questions. See supra note 19. It even has been suggested that
the English common-law courts' historic right to demand in a jury trial a special verdict reciting
only the jury's findings of historical facts undercuts any claim that the jury is constitutionally re-
quired to apply the law to the facts. See Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, 360 U.S. 273, 282 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Weiner, supra note 2, at 1920 n.265.
116. Some cases hold that the seventh amendment applies even to newly created statutory claims
and defenses in actions at law. E.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192-94 (1974). Nevertheless,
Curtis and many other cases recognize a power in Congress to eliminate the jury entirely by
designating a proceeding as "statutory," "administrative," "equitable," or as one involving "public
rights." Id. at 195 (statutory rights can be enforced by administrative process); Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977) (public rights); Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) (dictum) (administrative rights); Katchen v. Landy, 382
U.S. 323, 339-40 (1966) (equitable rights); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1937) (statutory proceeding). Although most exceptions to the jury trial right involve administra-
tive hearings, the legal and equitable exceptions have also been used by legislatures to eliminate the
jury in judicial proceedings. See supra note 19. For a critique of this narrow view of the seventh
amendment, see Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's Assault on
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cussed below, make it very difficult to describe in general or theoretical terms
the applicability of the seventh amendment to the process of law application.
They do demonstrate, however, that the jury's present hegemony over the pro-
cess of law application must be predicated on something more than the seventh
amendment.
Although constitutional and legislative intent may have pointed the way to
the modem approach to law application, that approach is as much a matter of
choice as of external command. One factor that has figured in the choice is
simple result orientation. Juries and some agencies are regarded as more "lib-
eral" or responsive to the needs of certain constituencies than are appellate
judges.'1 7 In addition, juries supposedly ignore legal rules inconsistent with
popular notions of justice or fairness. 118 Result orientation is a two-edged
sword, however, and one which proponents of the modem result may prefer not
to unsheath in this time of political and economic conservatism.' 19
Another possible reason for the gravitation of law-applying powers toward
the trial level is the widely held belief that agencies and juries are more compe-
tent at law application than are appellate judges and, therefore, ought to be the
ones to wield such powers. Agencies supposedly draw on their experience and
technical expertise,' 20 juries on their greater sense of community values, cus-
toms, practices, and standards.1 2 1 Written agency opinions, however, have
often revealed a decisional process that was less than expert.122 Furthermore, in
the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (1978). State legislatures and courts also exercise
such "legal" classification powers. E.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310-11, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-
47 (classifying the statutory question of what constitutes an unfair method of competition or an
unfair or deceptive act or practice as a question of law in a consumer's action for damages that
otherwise is triable to the jury); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (Supp. 1985) (U.C.C. § 2-302(1)
(1978)) (classifying the defense of unconscionability as a question of law).
117. Juries are believed to favor individual claimants over governmental and corporate defend-
ants, but this tendency apparently occurs less frequently than expected. See Broeder, The University
of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 750-51 (1959). Similarly, many agencies like the
National Labor Relations Board and state workers' compensation boards were created in part to
provide forums more sympathetic to working persons than courts had been. L. JAFFE & N. NA-
THANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 122-23 (4th ed. 1976).
Trial judges, who as a class generally are not regarded as "liberal," are also the beneficiaries of a
shift in power towards the trial level. In most cases, however, the trial judge will not be the fact
finder if any party demands jury trial. Hence, liberals should not be concerned that a shift in power
towards the trial level will increase the power of trial judges.
118. 0. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 237-
38 (1920).
119. To counter trial level "liberalism," appellate courts could begin to take a more expansive
view of their own powers. Thus, it has been suggested that rising personal injury verdicts after
World War II prodded appellate courts into finding new or expanded powers of review to contain
such verdicts. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 752-
58 (1957).
120. For a typical judicial statement about the importance of agency expertise, see United States
v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 65-67 (1956).
121. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1874).
122. In United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), for example, the Court found
that the ICC had primary jurisdiction to determine whether bombs without bursters and fuses at-
tached were subject to the high tariff rate established for incendiary bombs. The Commission, and
not the courts, supposedly knew whether the high rate reflected the danger and special handling
required for such bombs and whether those without fuses and bursters required such special han-
dling. The resulting Report of the Commission, United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 309 I.C.C. 249
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applying modem statutes, many of which are extremely vague and broad,1 23
agencies must often make primary policy decisions requiring more than techni-
cal expertise. 124 Consequently, in recent years the federal courts and Congress
have become more active in reviewing agency regulations, even those incorporat-
ing expert scientific or technical judgments.125 This new judicial and congres-
sional assertiveness in reviewing regulations may never spread to adjudication
and the process of law application,1 2 6 but it has helped to undo the myth of
expertise as an inviolable shield for agency action.127
Historically the jury has been valued as much for its disinclination to honor
the law as for its skill in applying the law to the facts. 12  As the costs of employ-
ing a jury in civil cases escalate alarmingly, 129 and as the jury's supposed advan-
tages are scrutinized ever more closely, the jury is increasingly defended not
(1959), fell far short of these expectations, arguing in effect that "a bomb is a bomb." Similarly, in In
re Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485, 488 (1953), the FTC, relying on its economic expertise, held that it
would hear evidence on the economic effects of exclusive dealing contracts challenged under § 3 of
the Clayton Act, even though in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 (1949), the
Suprere Court had excluded such evidence as "ill suited" for the consideration of courts. In subse-
quent exclusive dealing cases, however, the Commission arguably made little use of its economic
expertise. Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 47-51
(1959).
123. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935), and Pan-
ama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935), the Supreme Court announced constitutional limits
on broad, undefined delegations of legislative power to agencies. These decisions have lost much of
their force, and broad, relatively undefined congressional delegations of power to agencies are now
commonplace. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1676-78, 1694-96 (1975) (discussing the delegation of broad discretionary power to
administrative agencies and the difficulty in requiring Congress to be more specific). While some
critics call for a revival of these constitutional limits on the delegation of legislative power, others
recognize that Congress cannot always specify policy in detail. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
27-51 (1969); Stewart, supra, at 1695.
124. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1188-91 (1973);
Stewart, supra note 123, at 1683-84, 1711-12.
125. Congressional oversight of agencies takes various forms. See generally W. GELLIIORN, C.
BYsE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 9, at 103-26 (legislative control of administrative action). Until
recently the most popular new form was the legislative veto, which now has been declared unconsti-
tutional. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Today some courts, like Congress, are taking a much
more active role in reviewing administrative action. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra
note 9, at 343-50.
126. Rule making and adjudication are of course alternative modes of agency policy making.
Aggressive judicial review of one mode, therefore, eventually may carry over to the other. On the
other hand, because adjudication is otherwise more amenable to judicial control, it may escape the
hard looks now being directed at rule making. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra
note 9, at 343-50.
127. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 471-75 (1954).
128. 0. HOLMES, supra note 118, at 237; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 7.4, at 305-06;
Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc. 166, 170 (1929).
129. As commentators have noted:
On the average a jury trial takes considerably more time than does a court trial. Ju-
rors must be selected and instructed, more witnesses are called to testify, final arguments
are longer, and more recesses are required. The result usually is higher counsel fees, more
extensive payments to experts, and increased trial costs in the form of fees for jurors and
witnesses.
J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 764 (3d ed. 1980). The jury trial is
also regarded as a serious cause of court congestion because normally it takes longer than a trial
before a judge. Id. at 777. In most jurisdictions, the trial judge calendar is much more current than
is the jury trial calendar. Id. at 763.
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because it is a superior fact finder 130 but because it is preferable to the trial
judges, who would be the jury's presumed successors in interest.1 3' Even if the
jury does have special competence in some matters, as it might in cases such as
those involving personal injury claims, 132 the results it reaches in specific cases
may also reflect its other "virtues," namely, its inclination to ignore unpopular
law, to render compromise verdicts, 133 to redistribute the wealth of corporate
and governmental defendants, 134 and in general to render a rough cut brand of
justice. Indeed, it is almost ironic to speak of the jury's special competence
when prospective jurors with unusual knowledge, abilities, or experience are
often the first to be excused or excluded by peremptory challenge.' 3 5 In any
event the jury is routinely assigned mixed questions for which it presumably has
no special competence and some complex ones for which it is arguably
incompetent. 1
36
In sum, present domination of the law-applying process by the trial level
cannot be explained in terms of the greater law-applying abilities of agencies and
juries. Often, however, juries and agencies are better at law application than are
judges. Should courts, then, make an ad hoc assessment of relative competence
for every mixed question going to the merits, as some judges have advocated?1
37
Making such an assessment accurately, openly, and candidly is never easy; 138
130. Those who advocate the use of the special verdict charge that juries do not reliably dis-
charge their roles as fact finders. See, eg., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 141-43 (1950). Similarly,
the use of juror affidavits to attack jury verdicts is both advocated and resisted because it might
reveal how rarely the jury performs ideally. E.g., Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432,
435 (2d Cir. 1947). Jerome Frank flatly asserted that jurors are incompetent fact finders. See J.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 180-81 (1930).
131. "I have too often heard practicing lawyers from our large cities insist that the one reason-
and that a compelling one-for preserving jury trial is that it is our best safeguard against the cor-
ruption of judges." Howe, Book Review, 215 ScL. AM., Sept. 1966, at 295, 298; see also infra notes
146-51 and accompanying text (discussing the competence of trial judges).
132. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 118, at 236-38.
133. The jury's inclination to compromise on damages when the question of liability is disputed
or doubtful is now widely recognized. Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1966) (dissenting
opinion).
134. See supra note 117.
135. Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 780-83 (1978); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial il Complex
Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REv. 898, 908-09 & n.63 (1979).
136. E.g., In re Japanese Elect. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that
due process may require taking from the jury complex or technical questions beyond the understand-
ing of laypersons).
137. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.);
Loper v. Morrision, 23 Cal. 2d. 600, 611-12, 145 P.2d 1, 6-7 (1944) (Traynor, J., dissenting);
Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuhe Issues of Material Fact,
99 F.R.D. 465, 469-75 (1984).
138. Assessments of relative competence are usually made primarily in terms of the nature.of the
question presented. See authorities cited supra note 137. Schwarzer poses three categories of ques-
tions-those peculiar to juries, those of predominantly legal content, and those that vary in the
context of the case. Schwarzer, supra note 137. Applying such distinctions in nonparadigm situa-
tions is impossible. The results would probably vary widely and turn on the personal fondness of
individual judges for the jury and its proclivities. See supra text accompanying notes 128-36. These
proclivities are seldom evaluated openly. Thus, juries historically have not been allowed to construe
the language of written contracts, supposedly because of jurors' possible illiteracy, because of the
need for certainty in commercial affairs, and because of the greater familarity of judges with com-
mercial matters. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
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making it for every material element of every possible claim and defense on the
merits would be endless, confusing, and uncertain. A general rule presumptively
favoring either the fact finders or the appellate judges, with whatever controls
and exceptions are necessary, is all that is practically possible-and is in fact
what we now have. Appellate courts are constitutionally and legislatively disfa-
vored, if not barred, from being the beneficiaries of such a presumption.
139
Moreover, in view of their crowded dockets and busy time schedules, 14° they
probably could not efficiently provide general free review. Indeed, the impracti-
cality of such a course in the face of the litigation explosion is arguably the
dynamic source of the modern shift in power towards the trial level. To provide
free review of ultimate facts, appellate courts would have to steal the necessary
additional time141 from the law-declaring function, which has already received
short shrift in this era of crowded dockets.1 42 Moreover, even if intermediate
appellate courts assumed the brunt of the new workload, the time tradeoff would
probably not be positive. 14 3 Intermediate appellate courts have no special com-
203-06 (1898). The obvious fear that juries sometimes might "rewrite" contracts to achieve popular
justice is never even mentioned. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1930-33 (discussing reasons juries tradi-
tionally were not permitted to interpret written contracts).
These assessments of relative competence, even when permitted by the seventh amendment, see
supra note 19, will always be troublesome. Not surprisingly, Dean Landis' support for this approach
in the administrative context, Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts, 47 YALE L.J. 519, 535
(1938), similarly has been questioned. See Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 899, 927 (1943) ("The result is apt in no small measure to turn upon whether the reviewing
court is blessed with more intellectual pride than humility, and also whether the question presented
for review appeals particularly to the sympathy and interest of the court.").
139. See supra text accompanying notes 105-16 (suggesting that both the seventh amendment
and the implied intent of recent statutes creating administrative adjudicative authority are bars to
general appellate hegemony with respect to the process of law application).
140. The increasing demands on federal appellate courts are discussed in Reynolds & Richman,
An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds & Richman, The Price of Reform]; Reyn-
olds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds &
Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent].
141. The general availability of free review might attract more appeals. Cf. Weiner, supra note
8, at 1040-41. The amount of time required for deciding a given question under free review probably
also would be greater. When the scope of review is narrow, the reviewing court can sometimes
confine its attention initially to the briefs and the oral argument and, absent strong signs of some-
thing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, affirm immediately. When the review is free, the appel-
late court seeks the "right" result rather than only an acceptable one, and if the alleged error is not
totally frivolous, the court may have to expend considerable additional time reviewing the record.
Admittedly the review of rulings on motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, which is free, see infra note 349, requires appellate familiarity with the record. One suspects,
however, that unless the court initially senses a wrong result, particularly in the grant of such a
motion, it might affirm on the basis of the briefs or only a cursory review of the record.
142. It has been suggested that the quality of opinions decreases as the caseload increases and as
time is stolen from the law-declaring role to meet the demands of the supervisory role. Hart, The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 98-101 (1959); accord Friendly, The "Law of the
Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 406, 408-09 (1972).
143. These courts are created primarily to assume the brunt of the appellate caseload and, there-
fore, of the supervisory role, leaving the jurisdiction's highest court to employ its new, principally
discretionary, jurisdiction to develop the body of the law. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING To COURT
ORGANIZATION § 1.13 commentary at 33-35 (1974). Intermediate appellate caseloads have bur-
geoned so dramatically in recent years, however, that these courts are hard pressed just to decide
cases, let alone discharge their own law-declaring function with any degree of sophistication. This
latter difficulty is especially troubling in the federal system in which the courts of appeals bear the
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petence over most mixed questions and would not necessarily decide them better
than would trial level fact finders. In addition, the availability of free review
might attract additional or marginal appeals, and, in any event, the fact specific
opinions of such courts would be readily distinguishable in subsequent cases. 144
In view of these considerations, free review of mixed law/fact questions is an
alternative best reserved for special situations. Even without free review, ordi-
nary cases are still subject to a variety of other appellate controls.1
4 5
Despite their crowded dockets, some appellate courts continue to favor free
review of ultimate facts found by trial judges.' 4 6 Once it may have been excuse
enough for such free review that the practice was not forbidden by constitution,
statute, or considerations of relative competence.14 7 Today, given the time de-
mands on appellate courts, a more positive justification is required-for in-
stance, that trial judges, unlike agencies and juries, are too often incompetent or
untrustworthy fact finders. Unfortunately, such a case can be made. Attorneys
everywhere aver, though usually off the record, that they would never assent to
the abolition of the civil jury system because local trial judges are so often in-
competent or untrustworthy. 14 8 Furthermore, trial judges sit alone, sometimes
deciding matters of great importance. 149 Without voting colleagues to provide
checks and balances, even the best trial judges will sometimes make aberrational
decisions 150 that only free review can unfailingly correct. 151
principal responsibility for developing nonconstitutional federal law. To deal'more effectively with
their caseloads, courts of appeals have employed various devices, including more sophisticated ad-
ministration, the use of three judge panels, the curtailment of oral argument time, the delegation of
increased responsibilities to law clerks, and, most recently, the use of unpublished opinions. See
Reynolds & Richman, The Price of Reform, supra note 140; Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential
Precedent, supra note 140; How well these devices will work remains to be seen. In the meantime
these courts clearly have no free time, and any proposal like free review, which would increase both
their caseloads and workloads, see supra note 141, would be unwelcome and arguably unwise.
144. The law-applying function "in the normal course is mainly for the agency because in the
normal course, the decisions will have little bearing on any other decision." Schotland, supra note
102, at 58 (emphasis added).
145. The most important of these controls, discussed infra Part IV, are the power to declare the
law, to set the limits of reasonableness in specific fact situations, and to classify certain determina-
tions as subject to free review.
146. See supra notes 76-77. More recently the Second Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to such
free review. See Karavos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Atlantica Export Corp., 588 F.2d 1, 7-9 (2d Cir.
1978). The Fourth Circuit strongly questioned its own commitment to free review, see Famous
Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 252-53 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974), and perhaps has now
abandoned it. The Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in following the "clearly erroneous" ap-
proach. See Gilmore v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 1344, 1350 (10th Cir. 1974). The First
Circuit remained undecided. See Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 976-77 (1st Cir. 1977).
But see Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980) (declining
to follow free review approach of Second Circuit because of Supreme Court's earlier contrary deci-
sion directly on point). Many of these opinions do not discuss the question of free review in these
general terms, but simply ask whether a particular mixed question is one of law or fact. This sug-
gests an ad hoc approach, the difficulties of which are explored supra note 138.
147. Stem, supra note 2, at 80-83, 112-13; Weiner, supra note 8, at 1032.
148. See Howe, supra note 131, at 139.
149. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976)
(suggesting that the trial judge exercises substantial powers in certain equitable suits of importance
to the public and to the parties, like reapportionment or school desegregation cases).
150. Stem, supra note 2, at 81. Arguably, other lone decision makers should be similarly feared.
Decisions of administrative law judges, however, generally are subject to free review by their agen-
cies. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Further, although some agencies
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Those who oppose free appellate review of trial level findings of ultimate
fact have argued that it attracts additional appeals and undermines the authority
of trial judges.152 The former contention is probably correct, though the exact
number of appeals so attracted is unknown and may not be large. 153 The latter
contention is strained. Trial judges whose decisions are subject to free appellate
review are not known to suffer morale problems and are not regarded as second
class citizens. Even if they are reversed somewhat more often on appeal than are
trial judges whose decisions are given greater deference, their determinations at
least are not ignominiously branded as "clearly erroneous." 154 Moreover, free
review is not an unfailing corrective for bias or error. Trial judges can still slant
or stack their historical fact-findings to shield their ultimate fact-findings from
reversal. 155 Perhaps in recognition of the potential for such "stacking," some
judges advocate free review of historical fact-findings not based on disputed tes-
timonial evidence, 156 in which situation the trial judge has no decisional
advantage.
The alternative to general free review of trial judge findings of ultimate fact
is the "clearly erroneous" standard, which is somewhat less deferential than are
the standards applicable to the same findings by juries or agencies.15 7 Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court has already stated that under the "clearly erro-
neous" standard greater deference must be given to trial judge findings based on
determinations involving the credibility of witnesses than to findings based on
documentary or physical evidence.15 8 The Court, therefore, might also be pre-
pared to hold that under this standard findings of ultimate fact are entitled to
less deference than findings of historical fact. Finally, appellate courts often take
a harder look at the determinations of individual trial judges or agencies with a
are headed by single persons, ordinarily these persons consult with their staffs in making decisions.
See generally Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REv. 363 (1976) (dis-
cussing changing public attitudes towards the administrative process).
151. Through free review an appellate court may reverse a questionable determination that is the
product of suspected passion or prejudice but that on its face is not "unreasonable" or "clearly
erroneous."
152. Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950); Weiner, supra
note 8, at 1039-41.
153. Weiner attempted to compare data from the Ninth Circuit, which does not conduct free
review of trial judge findings, and the Second Circuit, which does exercise free review, but the results
are inconclusive. See Weiner, supra note 8, at 1041. Trial judge fact-findings that are narrowly
reviewed yet overturned on appeal receive the "clearly erroneous" brand of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
See supra note 7.
154. Weiner, supra note 8, at 1040.
155. The most egregious examples of stacked or slanted findings seem to occur when trial judges
adopt, without change, proposed findings submitted by the winning party, findings which the United
States Supreme Court has recently described as tending to "[take] the form of conclusory statements
unsupported by citation to the record" and having the "potential for overreaching and exaggera-
tion .. " Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985). Obviously, a trial
judge intent on insulating a particular decision from reversal could formulate such findings, with or
without the assistance of a party.
156. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950). Contra
Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 113-15 (9th Cir. 1962). The Lundgren view that such findings
are subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) is now the law. See supra
notes 4748.
157. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
158. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512-13 (1985).
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reputation for untrustworthiness and at cases of unusual public importance. 159
Arguably, they are also free to take a hard look at any suspicious or important
trial judge finding of ultimate fact.
160
These atmospheric variations on the "clearly erroneous" standard suggest
that in practice it may not be very different from general free review, which is
probably subject to equivalent inverse atmospheric variations when the case is
unimportant or the trial judge's reputation is strong.161 Both approaches are
compromises between the possible and the desirable. The "clearly erroneous"
approach, however, seems preferable because it allows, at least in theory, a sym-
metrical appellate approach to all trial level decision makers.' 62 Even though
"atmospheric" differences remain, this approach downplays what are increas-
ingly unimportant historical and institutional differences among these decision
makers.
1 63
In the past half century, federal appellate courts have confirmed the pre-
sumptive hegemony of agencies and juries over the process of law application,
have begun to accord doctrinally equivalent status to trial judges, and have nar-
rowed, eliminated, or frozen most of the exceptions to this hegemony. The ac-
companying shift in power towards the trial level has been dictated less by
external command than by modern conditions, which include the increasing de-
pendence on and acceptance of administrative adjudication, the explosive
growth of adjudicative caseloads, and the resulting physical inability of appellate
159. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 9, at 343-350; 5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, 52.03[1], at 52-27 (1982). Although the term "hard look" originally was
used by Judge Leventhal to describe how agencies themselves should approach their duties, see
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971), it now also describes an aggressive appellate approach in reviewing agency determi-
nations. See also Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judi-
cial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV.
713, 729-33 (1977) (suggesting that sloppy and ill-considered decision making at EPA in its early
years inspired judicial efforts to prod the agency into articulating the grounds for its actions in
greater detail to facilitate close judicial review).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides no basis or criterion for such a selective approach to the
review of trial judge findings. Appellate judges also do not admit publicly to such selectivity. For-
mer appellate law clerks in off-the-record conversations, however, regularly attest that both impor-
tant cases and the decisions of certain notorious trial judges are scrutinized more carefully than
others.
161. In Karavos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Atlantica Export Corp., 588 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1978),
Judge Friendly, while defending the use of free review in the Second Circuit, said: "Perhaps in the
long run we do not come out very differently than does, for example, the Fifth Circuit with its broad
reading of 'findings of fact' .... " In the Fifth Circuit, which follows the alternative "clearly erro-
neous" approach, a determination based on an erroneous legal standard, which the court is appar-
ently astute enough to find, will be reversed as a matter of law. See, e.g., Fromberg, Inc. v.
Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 409 n.3 (5th Cir. 1963).
162. Weiner has collected cases in which the "clearly erroneous" test was applied to a trial
judge's determination of ultimate fact because, inter alia, the same determination previously had
been treated as a question of fact in the judge/jury context. Weiner, supra note 8, at 1044 nn. 143-44
& 148. Similarly, in Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957), which is
discussed at length in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958), the
question of employment for workers' compensation purposes was classified as "legal" in the judge/
jury context because it had already been designated a jurisdictional fact in the administrative con-
text. Adams, 230 S.C. at 543, 96 S.E.2d at 571-72.




courts to guarantee the correctness of all trial level findings of ultimate fact. The
resulting inclusion of the law application process within the discretionary power
of the trial level, however, does not amount to total trial level control. Appellate
courts may still redirect or limit trial level power through their own power to
make the law.
IV. APPELLATE CONTROL OF TRIAL LEVEL DISCRETIONARY POWER
THROUGH THE LAWMAKING POWER
A. In General
The trial level's function is to exercise discretionary power of one kind or
another as defined by and within the limits set by law. The appellate function is
to establish the relevant definitions and limits through the exercise of lawmaking
power, carried out principally through the free review of questions of law. For
discussion purposes, the lawmaking power of the appellate courts can be subdi-
vided into three subsidiary powers: (1) the law declaration power, which is the
power to declare the law and thus to impose on the trial level decision maker
general rules affecting all cases that come within the rules' terms; 164 (2) the su-
pervisory power, which is the power to state as a matter of law, generally
through rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence, that a particular trial level
finding of historical or ultimate fact exceeds the limits of the discretion con-
ferred; 165 and (3) the classification power, which is the power to withdraw par-
ticular mixed law/fact questions from the discretionary power of the trial level
by classifying them as questions of law or as constitutional or jurisdictional
facts. Through these three powers appellate courts define the trial level's discre-
tionary power, set the outer limits thereto in specific fact situations, and occa-
sionally take the power for themselves.
Although these three powers are different, they can be used as complemen-
tary means to achieve the same end. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1 66 for
example, the United States Supreme Court redefined the law of defamation,
holding that public officials-and subsequently public figures 167-- must show by
clear and convincing proof 168 that persons charged with libel acted with actual
malice. A trial level finding on the actual malice question also was classified as a
constitutional fact and therefore as a question subject to free appellate review.
169
164. The many forms of the law-declaring power are set out infra text accompanying notes 194-
202.
165. See, eg., Kircher v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948)
(whether plaintiff's doubtful version of an accident was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of
negligence).
166. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
167. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
168. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971); New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at
285-86. Clear and convincing proof is more than a preponderance of the evidence, the civil standard,
but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the criminal standard. Nader v. de Toledano, 408
A.2d 31, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
169. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 284-86. The Court held that the free review of constitu-
tional facts found by a jury would not amount to a "reexamination" within the meaning of the
seventh amendment because alternative constitutional values were at stake. Id. at 285 n.26.
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Thereafter, under the supervisory power, courts of appeals encouraged the grant
of summary judgment whenever plaintiff's evidence of actual malice appeared to
be legally insufficient by regularly affirming such grants. 170 Thus, the appellate
courts declared and defined the new ultimate fact of actual malice, assumed for
themselves, by classifying actual malice as a constitutional fact, the principal say
in its determination, and, through a general willingness to affirm trial judge
grants of summary judgment, actively supervised its assertion. Thus, the three
appellate powers together were employed to narrow trial level discretionary
power over defamation claims and to defeat or discourage the assertion of many
of them. 171
Of these three appellate powers, the classification power is perhaps the most
drastic in that it amounts to a direct judicial assault on the prerogatives of fact
finders. 172 For that reason, perhaps, it is invoked very selectively, particularly
in the judge/jury context, and ordinarily without fanfare or explanation other
than the ambiguous statement that the question presented is one of law 173 or of
constitutional or jurisdictional fact. 174 The failure to elaborate on why a partic-
ular ultimate fact is so classified has cloaked the judge/jury question in unneces-
sary confusion and mystery and has retarded understanding of when and why
the exceptional classification power should be invoked.175 The discussion to fol-
low examines the sources and uses of this power and of the companion powers to
declare the law and to supervise its application to the facts.
170. E.g., Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Washington Post
Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9
(1979) (dictum), the Supreme Court questioned the widespread use of summary judgment when
actual malice is at issue because such state of mind questions normally are regarded as inappropriate
for summary disposition. This dictum has had some effect, but many lower federal courts are still
granting summary judgment in these cases. See Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice
Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 707, 711 (1984).
171. Louis, supra note 170, at 707-08.
172. The practical conflict between the classification power and the seventh amendment is dis-
cussed supra note 19.
173. In Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held in a statutory treble damage action that what constitutes "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" within the meaning of a state version of the Federal Trade Commission Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981), is never a jury question. The court offered no reason for distinguishing
this ultimate fact from others routinely assigned to the jury other than to characterize it as a ques-
tion of "law." Hardy, 288 N.C. at 310-11, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47. Although the court cited other
cases holding that the question was "legal," those cases involved only the other, more commonplace
appellate powers to define the statutory term and to supervise its reasonable application to specific
facts. Id. None of them held, or even intimated, that this ultimate fact could never be decided by a
jury.
174. The identification of constitutional facts is less obscure because they must relate to a consti-
tutional right, and there are no seventh amendment problems. See supra note 19. The identification
of jurisdictional facts was an obscure process, see infra note 269 and accompanying text, but the
doctrine is moribund today. The doctrine created no seventh amendment problems because it was
limited to administrative adjudication.
175. In Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975), the Supreme Court of North
Carolina may have invoked the classification power out of fear of large treble damage awards against
local businesses by juries deciding cases under the broad, elastic terms of the applicable statute. As
the discussion infra Part IV C will indicate, this is not necessarily an invalid basis for invocation of
the classification power.
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B. The Supervisory and Law-Declaring Powers
Appellate judges supervise findings of historical fact and ultimate fact in
essentially the same way-principally through challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence. 176 Although the reasoning process in reviewing these two kinds of
determinations may be somewhat different, 177 the final supervisory step in each
is essentially the same-the appellate conclusion that on the evidence, or on the
law and the facts, the determination is or is not within the ambit of the fact
finder's discretion. Such supervisory conclusions are declarations of law that are
binding on lower courts in future cases;' 78 they are highly fact specific, however,
and the cases announcing them are often easily distinguished in future
litigation. 179
Findings of ultimate fact and supervisory conclusions with respect to such
findings are expressed in terms of specific statements applicable to particular fact
situations. °80 Law declaration, however, is expressed in terms of fact-free gen-
eral statements applicable to all-or at least to many-cases. Thus, it is a decla-
ration of law to state that as a class newsboys may be "employees" within the
meaning of a statute; 18 it is an application of law to fact to say that particular
newsboys are or are not employees; and it is a supervisory conclusion to say that
on the law and the facts that determination is or is not reasonable.
182
The line between law application and law declaration is generally the divid-
ing point between the duties of the jury and the duties of the trial judge and
between deferential and free appellate review. The line, however, is a moving
one directly responsive to the particularity with which the legal principles gov-
erning a particular ultimate fact have been elaborated. As Professor Monaghan
has observed:
Law application. . . is residual in character. It involves relating the
legal standard of conduct to the fact established by the evidence. If all
legal propositions could be formulated in great detail, this function
would be rather mechanical and require no distinctive consideration.
But such is not the case. Linking the rule to the conduct is a complex
psychological process, one that often involves judgment. The more
general the rule, the larger the domain for judgment. Thus, law appli-
176. The standards applicable to the review of such findings by judges, juries, and agencies are
discussed supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
177. Because two interacting variables are involved, law application may be somewhat more
judgmental or normative, or at least less mechanical, than historical fact-finding. Monaghan, supra
note 3, at 236.
178. See McClam v. New York Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 415, 415-16 (E.D.S.C. 1935) (consider-
ing whether evidence that an insured is found dead of a self-inflicted gunshot wound, a recurring fact
situation, coupled with the presumption against suicide, is legally sufficient proof of accidental death
in an action on the policy).
179. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494, at 296 (Chadbourn rev. ed.).
180. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 234-36.
181. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (holding as a matter of law that news-
boys could be employees entitled to bargain collectively within the meaning of the Wagner Act, even
though they may not have been employees or servants for tort or workers' compensation purposes).
L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 558-64.
182. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill (1944) (also affirming as reasonable the
NLRB's ultimate finding that the newsboys in question were employees).
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cation frequently entails some attempt to elaborate the governing
norm .... By definition, when law application occurs, further ex-
plicit norm elaboration ceases.
183
In theory an ultimate fact may be found, or its reasonableness may be as-
sessed, without the declaration of detailed legal principles adapted to the factual
peculiarities of the case.18 4 In practice, however, that is unlikely, especially in
recurring types of fact situations in which general rules often underlie, or can be
derived from, the specific determinations being made. For example, in a series
of cases involving proof of conspiracy through evidence of defendants' con-
sciously parallel conduct,1 8 5 appellate courts exercising the supervisory power
affirmed a trial judge's finding of conspiracy,18 6 a jury's finding of no conspir-
acy,18 7 and a trial judge's grant of summary judgment for insufficient evidence of
conspiracy.188 Each decision also asserted, either explicitly or implicitly, a gen-
eral legal principle about proof of conspiracy through evidence of consciously
parallel conduct. Two of the cases asserted that consciously parallel behavior
can be, but is not always, legally sufficient evidence of conspiracy;18 9 one of the
cases asserted that such behavior cannot be legally conclusive evidence of
conspiracy. 190
Similarly, in the famous case of The T.J. Hooper,191 Judge Learned Hand,
writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affirmed
the trial court's ultimate fact-finding that a tugboat was unseaworthy when it
left port without a radio capable of receiving weather reports, even though the
custom of the industry was not to provide such equipment. This apparent super-
visory affirmance, however, was grounded on the general legal principle that
conformance to industry custom does not necessarily establish due care as a
matter of law. 192 The converse legal principle, that conformance to industry
custom is conclusive of due care, would have eliminated all law-applying discre-
tion on these facts and would have required a determination of seaworthiness as
183. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 236.
184. For example, the Supreme Court has been criticized for its decision in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), affirming as reasonable, without further explication, the applica-
tion to the facts of the Labor Board's newly announced legal test for who was an "employee." L,
JAFFE, supra note 3, at 559.
185. In such cases two or more competitors do (or refuse to do) the same thing-i.e., charge the
same prices or refuse to deal with plaintiff--each with knowledge of the other's conduct. The ques-
tion is whether this consciously parallel conduct is evidence of an agreement to act together, a re-
quirement of § I of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
186. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
187. Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (plaintiff, the party
with the burden of proof, not entitled to a directed verdict or judgment nothwithstanding the verdict
on such evidence).
188. Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 204-05 (3d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
189. See Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939); Delaware Valley Marine
Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1961), cert denied, 369 U.S. 839
(1962); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962).
190. Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954).
191. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
192. Id. at 740.
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a matter of law. Alternatively, if a trial level finding that the tug was seaworthy
had been reversed as a matter of law, that supervisory conclusion could have
amounted to a direct or implied legal requirement that tugs be equipped with
such a radio.
1 93
The law-declaring power, of course, includes more than these minimal uses.
It includes the recognition of new common-law claims and defenses, 194 the iden-
tification of the legislative purposes of new claims and defenses created by stat-
ute, 195 the ascertainment of the essential elements of all claims and defenses,
196
the development of appropriate definitions or tests for these elements, 197 the
identification of the factors that may or may not be considered in determining
the existence of an essential element, 19 8 the assignment of the appropriate
weight to be given relevant factors, 199 the identification of the party with the
burden of proof,2° ° the degree of proof required,20 1 and, when appropriate, the
development of presumptions or other guides to decision.20 2 Together these fac-
ets of law declaration can be employed to elaborate the law in such detail that
fact finder discretion is substantially narrowed. Appellate courts do not regu-
larly assay such heavy-handed elaboration. In The Common Law, however, Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes urged courts to act vigorously in accordance with the "fair
teaching of experience." 20 3 He believed that in recurring situations courts
should use the law-declaring power both to "codify" consistent jury determina-
tions and to resolve inconsistent ones by making choices themselves; experienced
judges could sometimes elaborate the law independently because they would
193. Although the court of appeals merely affirmed the trial judge's determination, the opinion
by Judge Hand implied that a contrary trial level determination would have been reversed. Hooper,
60 F.2d at 740. Although a reversal could have been based on the supervisory conclusion that a
finding of seaworthiness was legally impermissible, Judge Hand believed in free review of the law-
applying determinations of trial judges, Weiner, supra note 8, at 1027, and perhaps would have been
prepared to reverse only on that basis, !e., that a finding of unseaworthiness on these facts was the
better result rather than the only reasonable one.
194. E.g., Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974) (recogniz-
ing the seat belt defense).
195. E.g., Mourning v. Family Publication Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 363-69 (1973) (purpose of the
Truth in Lending Act); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 5-10, 271 N.E.2d 592, 596-99 (1971) (Massa-
chusetts no-fault statute).
196. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that "actual malice" is
an essential element of libel claims by public officers).
197. Id. (defining actual malice to include "reckless disregard" for the truth).
198. E.g., Standard Oil Co. (Standard Stations) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (actual
market effects of defendant's exclusive supply contracts need not be considered in deciding whether
their effect "may be" substantially to lessen competition under § 3 of the Clayton Act).
199. E.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1944) (reversing a court of ap-
peals for overemphasizing the factor of employer control in determining whether newsboys were
employees for statutory collective bargaining purposes); accord General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 393 n.19 (1982) (whether a particular factor is decisive of an ultimate
fact is a question of law subject to independent appellate judgment).
200. E.g., Knowles v. Gilcrest Co., 362 Mass. 642, 289 N.E.2d 879 (1972) (requiring bailee to
prove due care for lost or destroyed articles).
201. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (in public officer libel
case, plaintiff must establish defendant's actual malice by clear and convincing proof).
202. E.g., Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935) (no presumption of negligence
when an automobile leaves the road without explanation).
203. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 120-24 (1881).
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know the sense of the community as well as or better than would an average
jury.2°4 Years later in the railroad crossing cases Justice Holmes effectively
staked this theory on the famous "stop, look, and listen rule."'20 5 With the rule's
subsequent repudiation, 20 6 Holmes' theory fell into disfavor, especially in the
negligence area.
20 7
The rejection of Holmes' theory was probably inevitable. Even in recurring
situations like railroad crossing accidents, the possible factual variations may be
too numerous208 to allow more legal specificity than that provided by a rebutta-
ble presumption of negligence. 20 9 A rebuttable presumption sets a standard of
conduct, to be sure, but it is a standard that leaves a great deal of discretion to
the fact finder. Indeed, such a presumption may be little more than an admoni-
tion to trial courts to supervise juries carefully and to grant binding instructions
or directed verdicts in extreme or paradigm cases. Although that is arguably a
far cry from what Justice Holmes had in mind, it requires a closer supervision of
juries than is prevalent in current negligence practice.
210
Furthermore, Holmesian activism, though formulated in neutral terms, in
practice could have amounted to a judicial attempt to control liberal fact find-
ers. 2 11 Judges tend to be more "conservative" than juries. Thus, the "codifica-
tion" Holmes advocated might have tended to produce more "conservative"
results. Even a relatively moderate elaboration of the law, however, would tend
to produce more conservative results because its "liberal" aspects would tend to
uphold results the juries would have reached anyway, whereas its "conservative"
ones would tend to require their reversal. 212 Although it is true that judges are
supposed to control juries by setting limits on their exercise of discretion, under
Justice Holmes' theory, the judges were allowed-perhaps even invited-to ex-
204. Id.
205. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (holding that a person injured by a
train at a railroad crossing was contributorily negligent as a matter of law if he or she failed to stop,
look, and listen before entering the crossing).
206. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934).
207. Courts are hesitant today to characterize even blatant conduct of a recurrent nature as
negligence as a matter of law, even though many or most juries would so characterize it and even
though this characterization would help to achieve consistent results. Traditionally, courts have
hesitated even to instruct juries that such recurrent conduct is negligent unless it is explained or
justified. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 203, at 120-24; cf Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.S.2d 444, 323
N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.2d 916 (1974) (whether failure to wear seat belts is negligence unless there is an
explanation or excuse presents a jury question).
208. The original stop, look, and listen decision in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S.
66 (1927), was criticized for this reason, even though on its facts it arguably presented a paradigm
case of negligence. Note, Aftermath of the Supreme Court's Stop, Look and Listen Rule, 43 HARV.
L. REv. 926, 927 n.5 (1930).
209. This rebuttable presumption is the equivalent of Holmes' "unless explained" approach, see
supra note 207, which he did not even mention in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927).
210. See supra note 207.
211. The stop, look, and listen decision in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927), in which the Supreme Court overturned both the jury's verdict for plaintiff and the trial
judge's refusal to grant a directed verdict, was arguably such a case in that it was designed to keep
personal injury cases of this type from juries.
212. James, supra note 91, at 687-88.
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ercise the discretionary power themselves. Not surprisingly, Holmes' view was
not well received in the liberal, claimant-oriented climate of recent decades.
Although today's courts are not systematically intent on narrowing fact
finder discretion through continuing elaboration of the law-and perhaps are
even too timid in that regard2 13-they exercise this method of control often
enough to warrant an inquiry into the circumstances that spur them into action
or persuade them to refrain from action. Obviously, appellate courts are more
likely to make law when they reverse trial courts, when the matter is important,
and when there is no easier way to reverse. Conversely, appellate courts will
tend to render only supervisory conclusions when they affirm trial courts in un-
important cases. It is difficult, however, to predict what appellate courts are
likely to do in cases that fall between these two extremes.
A typical case involves the review of a finding of ultimate fact that, like the
question of negligence, involves the application of a broad legal concept to the
historical facts. An appellate court may simply affirm the trial level finding as
"reasonable. ' 214 At other times, an appellate court may elaborate the law more
fully and "extrude from [the broad legal concept] quite specific rules of law to
guide or determine the exercises of power."'2 15 Sometimes such specific rules are
declared initially by the trial level decision maker, thereby inviting and often
compelling appellate review. Although such review is supposed to be free, some-
times appellate courts will simply accept the new rule-and its resulting applica-
tion to the facts-as reasonable, especially when such a rule is declared by a
policy making agency and involves a novel, difficult, technical, or subsidiary
legal question.2 16 The nature and propriety of this appellate deference to admin-
istrative law declaration has provoked a lively discussion among the commenta-
tors.2 1 7  The United States Supreme Court, however, has never said
categorically in such situations that it could not make an independent determi-
nation,2 18 and in many other similar situations it has made an independent de-
213. In his concurring opinion in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1949), Justice Frank-
furter states that a "timid judge, like a biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless judge."
214. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
215. L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 562.
216. E.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (deference to administrative interpreta-
tions of wage and hour provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to whether employee
waiting time amounts to compensable working time). Judge Friendly discussed other cases asserting
the need for such deference and the controversy thus created in Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Del-
laventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976); see also S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY 272-74 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing appellate deference to administrative
law declaration).
217. See L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 557-58 (suggesting that courts may, but sometimes choose
not to, review such agency determinations independently); Stern, supra note 2, at 106-09 (arguing
that Congress intended agencies to fill the interstices of the statutes they administer and that the
scope of court review is thereby limited). See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 216,
at 272-74 (discussing appellate deference to administrative law declaration).
218. But see Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449-51 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concur-
ring) (criticizing the majority's free, albeit approving, review of the agency's interpretation of its
statute). Arguably, courts must, or as a prudential matter should, defer to adjudicative rules de-
clared by an agency that has parallel rule making power, because an agency can employ such rule
making power to reinstate its original administrative judgment. Of course Congress has delegated
lawmaking power to agencies along with prescribed rule making procedures and has not necessarily
mandated analogous authority for rule making in adjudication.
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termination.219 Arguably, then, this aberrant doctrine of deference to
administrative law declaration is more voluntary and prudential than
mandatory, and the real question is what factors are relevant to the doctrine's
invocation. It turns out that these factors are approximately the same as those
that in other situations seem to persuade appellate courts simply to affirm as
reasonable trial level findings of ultimate fact without attempting to elaborate
the governing legal norms.
220
To demonstrate the nature of these factors, it is useful to compare the deci-
sions in two well-known pairs of labor cases. In the first pair, the United States
Supreme Court held as a matter of law that both newsboys, NLRB v. Hearst
Publications,22 1 and foremen, Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,222 could be em-
ployees entitled to bargain collectively within the meaning of the national labor
laws, even though newsboys are less supervised and more independent than most
employees, 223 and even though foremen, as supervisors of employees, are re-
garded for some purposes as part of management. 224 In Hearst the Court also
affirmed as a matter of law the National Labor Relation Board's adoption of a
vague "statutory purpose" test to determine who in fact was an "employee.
'225
The Court declined, however, to define or to explicate this "statutory purpose"
test beyond the Board's elaboration and simply accepted as reasonable the
Board's finding that the newsboys in question were employees. 226 In Packard,
which was decided three years later, the Court settled the matter by finding that
foremen not only could be, but were, "employees" as a matter of law.227 Thus,
in Hearst the Labor Board was accorded wide law-applying discretion whereas
in Packard its discretion was totally eliminated.
228
On their special facts these two cases are not necessarily inconsistent. In
both, the Supreme Court properly addressed questions concerning the primary
purpose of the statute.229 In Hearst, however, the Court still faced a difficult
219. E.g., NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951) (reviewing independently and
reversing the Labor Board's construction of a federal labor statute).
220. Accord L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 546-94 (discussing cases in which appellate courts defer
to administratively declared general principles and decide whether to refine existing general princi-
ples applied by agencies to novel fact decisions).
221. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
222. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
223. The court of appeals had found that this lack of supervision made the newsboys independ-
ent contractors. Hearst Publications v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1943).
224. Members of management are barred from being represented through collective bargaining.
Packard, 330 U.S. at 493-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
225. The Board had rejected contentions that either state law or an essence of general common
law derived from tort and workers' compensation law was controlling and had looked instead to the
purposes of the Wagner Act. The Supreme Court agreed with the Board's approach. Hearst, 322
U.S. at 120-30.
226. Id. at 130-32.
227. 'Packard, 330 U.S. at 488; accord L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 561 (also comparing Hearst
with Packard).
228. The NLRB had divided and vacillated on this question in the past. Packard, 330 U.S. at
492. Because foremen met the other requirements for collective bargaining, the Court found as a
matter of law that they qualified as "employees" within the statute. Id. at 487-90.
229. In Hearst the Court concluded that the benefits of collective bargaining should be available
to persons not technically servants under common-law principles. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 120-30. In
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mixed question that was new, 230 highly fact specific,2 3' not readily amenable to
the formulation of general principles, 232 and which Congress had assigned for
initial decision to an expert agency with broad adjudicative and rule making
power over national labor policy. These factors justified the Supreme Court's
acceptance of the agency's initial statement and application of its "statutory
purpose" test as reasonable, 233 even though this decision left for future decisions
a difficult mixed question.234 By contrast, the basic question in Packard-
whether foremen were employees-was of great national importance,2 35 was
bound to recur in many cases without significant factual variation, 236 and called
for a definite resolution one way or the other. Moreover, because the question in
Packard had divided the Board and lower courts previously, 237 its definitive res-
olution by the Supreme Court was especially desirable.
The second pair of illustrative cases involved new provisions of the labor
laws requiring the officers of unions and of national labor organizations of which
the unions were affiliates to file noncommunist affidavits. 238 In NLRB v. High-
Packard the Court concluded that these benefits should also be available to some supervisory em-
ployees. Packard, 330 U.S. at 488-93.
230. When the problem arises in a context so new and unsettled that the rule-makers do not
yet know what factors should shape the result, the case may be a good one to leave to lower
court discretion. . . . [This] permits experience to accumulate at the lowest court level
before the appellate judges commit themselves to a prescribed rule.
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635,
662 (1971).
231. The specifics of the arrangements between Hearst and its newsboys were quite elaborate,
covering such items as street location, districting for distribution, equipment and inventory, prices,
credit terms, hours, and other forms of effort expected. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 115-19. Thus, these
newsboys could have been more or less independent than some others, and more general rules, if
possible, had to await the process of case law development.
232. See id. at 121.
One of the "good" reasons for conferring discretion on the trial judge is the sheer impracti-
cability of formulating a rule of decision for the matter in issue. Many questions that arise
in litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule because they involve multifarious, fleet-
ing, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization-at least for the time being.
Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 662.
233. Unsupervised trial level discretion can become the equivalent oflawlessness. Consequently,
courts cannot allow agencies indefinitely to make broad undefined leaps from the facts and vague
statutory requirements to otherwise unexplained results. In Hearst, however, the question was
novel, and the NLRB apparently was not trying to mask its result in vague, conclusory language.
Hence, there was no reason to criticize the Court's initial reluctance to grasp the nettle itself.
234. The Court held only that a relatively "uncontrolled" newsboy could be an "employee" for
collective bargaining purposes. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130-32. The Board still had to determine
whether particular newsboys enjoying varying amounts of independence could be employees for such
purposes. See supra note 231.
235. Because virtually every factory in America had foremen who might have sought union
representation, it was important both to know whether they could do so and to choose a bright line
test-all may or may not-that would obviate the need for particularized adjudication in each spe-
cific situation.
236. The Packard Motor Car Company had approximately 1100 foremen, divided into four dis-
tinct categories. Packard, 330 U.S. at 487. The Court's decision apparently made these and other
factual variations among foremen legally insignificant for purposes of the Wagner Act.
237. Packard, 330 U.S. at 492. In the Supreme Court there were also four dissents on this
important but difficult question. Id. at 495-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
238. National Labor Relation Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 136, 146, repealed by
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 201(d), 73 Stat.
519, 525.
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land Park Manufacturing Co.2 3 9 the Supreme Court overruled the National La-
bor Relations Board and held as a matter of law that the term "national labor
organization" included federations of national unions like the Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations (CIO). Five years later, however, in NLRB v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. 240 the Court, citing Hearst, deferred to the agency's narrow, techni-
cal test for who was an "officer" of a union or a labor organization; the Court
held the agency finding to be "a reasonable, if indeed not a compelling, construc-
tion of the statute.
'24 1
The appeals in both cases involved challenges to the Board's initial declara-
tion of new rules of decision.242 In Highland Park, as in Packard, the Supreme
Court made an independent judgment. In Coca-Cola, as in Hearst, the Court
deferred to the reasonable judgment of the Board. Once again, however, the two
cases are distinguishable in terms of the factors that seem to persuade appellate
courts to act aggressively. In Highland Park the question of the CIO's status
was narrow and specific; it involved policy considerations transcending the
agency's labor expertise 243 and was arguably too important and too close to the
heart of the original legislative intent to be fobbed off as a reasonable exercise of
administrative discretion.244 By contrast, the question in Coca-Cola was less
important and more technical.245 Additionally, the Board's narrow answer,
though once again an apparent attempt to limit the reach of a distasteful statu-
tory provision, was not, as in Highland Park, so obvious a challenge to the will
of Congress. Furthermore, the broader, functional definition favored by the
court of appeals would have required a fact specific, expert inquiry in subsequent
proceedings. 24 6 The agency's views on this question, therefore, were entitled to
greater respect.
These cases suggest that an appellate decision to declare the law or to defer
to a trial level declaration thereof is the result of a host of interrelated factors
involving the nature, importance, novelty, and technicality of the question, the
relative abilities of the trial and appellate levels to answer it initially or perma-
nently, and the type of trial level decision maker involved. Another relevant
239. 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
240. 350 U.S. 264 (1956).
241. Id. at 269.
242. In Highland Park the Board had held that as a definitional matter a federation of national
unions could not be a "national labor organization" within the meaning of the statute. Highland
Park, 341 U.S. at 324. In Coca-Cola the Board had narrowly defined an "officer" of a union as a
person designated an officer in the union's constitution, while the court of appeals applied the
broader "functional test" and defined "officer" as a person who is an effective instrument of the
union's policies. Coca-Cola, 350 U.S. at 266, 268.
243. The problem had more to do with the nation's response to the alleged communist conspir-
acy than with national labor policy per se. Cf. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950)
(reversing ICC rule upholding race discrimination on interstate railroads).
244. If Congress had intended to rid organized labor of "reds," presumably it would not have
exempted from the statute the officers of the CIO and AFL or permitted the Board and the courts to
thwart its purpose. Accord Highland Park, 341 U.S. at 325 (noting that the congressional purpose of
the Act was to eradicate adherents to the Communist Party at every level of union leadership).
245. Coca-Cola, 350 U.S. at 269. The contention of the court of appeals that an "officer" should
be defined in a functional way, see supra note 242, required some understanding of union operations
and of the numbers and types of persons potentially included within the concept.
246. See supra note 245.
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factor is the appellate court's sense that the trial level decision maker is biased or
interested in the outcome of the particular determination. In the famous Sears,
Roebuck & Co. V. Stiffel Co.2 47 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 24 8
decisions, for example, fact finder discretion under the common law of unfair
competition was virtually eliminated by federal preemption, in part because the
Supreme Court apparently did not trust fact finders and lower courts to apply
this law wisely.249 Similarly, the Court has recently restated in stricter terms
the minimum contacts test for state judicial jurisdiction under the due process
clause.2 50 State courts are clearly interested in the outcome of these determina-
tions and the companion choice of law determinations. Moreover, the case law
regarding minimum contacts had reached the limits of due process. The stricter
test the Court has developed may limit the number of case by case reviews of
constitutional fact-findings that would attend a broader test allowing easy dis-
tinctions among cases.
25 1
C. The Classification Power
1. Classifying Ultimate Facts as Questions of Law
Reasonable trial level findings of ultimate fact normally are not disturbed
on appeal, even though the reviewing court prefers or itself would have reached
a different result. The narrow appellate review for reasonableness, in conjunc-
tion with review for all other errors of law, should guarantee just results in most
cases, even though it will sanction a few wrong but "reasonable" results. For
some mixed questions, however, such as those determinative of constitutional
rights, even occasional wrong results are arguably unacceptable, and special pro-
cedures designed to prevent such results, like free appellate review, are justified.
Free review of mixed questions is an implicit consequence of classifying a
particular ultimate fact as a question of law or as a question of constitutional or
jurisdictional fact.252 Under the law classification, 253 courts and legislatures
may classify as "legal" mixed questions going to the merits that are analytically
indistinguishable from those routinely classified as questions of fact.254 For ex-
247. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
248. 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (holding that federal patent law preempts state unfair competition law
making it wrongful to copy the appearance of an unpatented product, unless the copy fails to dis-
close through labeling the identity of its manufacturer or marketer).
249. Brown, Symposium: Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1216,
1221-22 (1964) (suggesting that trial level distaste for those who practiced product simulation tended
to lead to findings of liability against such persons).
250. Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 408-09
(1980).
251. Id. at 431-32. Arguably, the Court has formulated bright line constitutional tests in other
areas to avoid the burden of reviewing endless findings of constitutional fact. See Strong, Dilemmic
Aspects, supra note 15, at 325-33 (1969).
252. See supra note 19; text accompanying notes 78-80.
253. There are few detailed studies of this law classification. The traditional one is J. THAYER,
supra note 138, at 183-262; one of the newer ones is Weiner, supra note 2.
254. This is not to say that mixed facts cannot be differentiated on the basis of their likely famili-
arity to jurors or the technical nature or complexity of their legal components. Indeed such distinc-
tions form the basis of most attempts to classify mixed questions as law or fact. See infra notes 296-
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ample, many common-law courts have traditionally classified as "legal" ques-
tions involving the construction and legal effect of writings,2 "5 the question
whether one charged with malicious prosecution acted with reasonable and
probable cause,25 6 and the question whether business or commercial conduct-
as opposed to everyday conduct in the negligence context-was reasonable.
257
Today, courts and legislatures sometimes classify as "legal" ultimate facts re-
quiring the application of technical statutory law to the facts,25 8 especially when
the underlying historical facts are disputed.
25 9
Yet, the law classification means more than free review. It also means the
exclusion of the jury from the initial trial level determination. 260 Indeed, this
classification is simply another way of referring to one major aspect of the
judge/jury problem; in actions at law those few ultimate facts classified as ques-
tions of law are for the judge, whereas the rest, which are classified as questions
of fact, are for the jury.
The classification of ultimate facts as questions of law amounts to a manip-
ulation of the law-fact doctrine to take questions from the jury or to subject the
trial level's resolution of questions to free appellate review. 26 1 Although law
classification is in theory an open-ended concept, today it is only occasionally
invoked in new situations, 2 62 and its established uses, at least for questions going
to the merits, 263 are mostly hoary and relatively few in number.264 In effect it is
301 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the existence and possible significance of such distinc-
tions does not change the analytic nature of the process of law application, which in all cases identi-
cally requires application of the relevant law to the relevant facts.
255. See supra note 138.
256. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 217 (2d ed. 1977); Weiner, supra note 2, at
1910-16.
257. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1896-1906.
258. E.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975) (considered supra notes 173-75).
A statutory example is U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978), which makes the defense of unconscionability a ques-
tion of law.
259. Schwarzer, supra note 137, at 472.
260. One could argue that jury exclusion, rather than free review, is the primary purpose of the
law classification in the judge/jury context. This contention cannot be resolved analytically because
under the seventh amendment jury exclusion and free appellate review are constitutionally linked.
See supra note 19. It also cannot be settled historically. Older cases and commentary tended to
discuss law classification primarily in terms of jury exclusion. J. THAYER, supra note 138, at 202.
Appellate courts may have found this justification more diplomatic than one asserting their own
superiority or their general mistrust of all trial level decision makers. Today, however, invocation of
the "law" classification seems to be based as much on thejudiciary's desire to have the principal say
on "questions of law" as on its desire to deprive the jury of any say whatsoever. F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 338; J. THAYER, supra note 138, at 205 n.3. Thus, the "law"
classification is, in substantial part at least, a device for providing free appellate review.
261. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 333-39.
262. E.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310-11, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-47 (1979) (a judicial
"legal" classification described supra notes 173-75); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (defense of unconsciona-
bility classified as a question of law). For further discussion of a possible but doubtful new federal
judicial "legal" classification, see supra note 162.
263. Courts are much less hesitant to characterize procedural or evidentiary law-applying deter-
minations as questions of law. See infra text accompanying notes 348-51.
264. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 338, mentions only those cases that re-
quire the judge rather than the jury to decide whether the defendant in a malicious prosecution or
false imprisonment action acted with reasonable and probable cause. James and Hazard also cite
Thayer, who mentions a few other early examples, J. THAYER, supra note 138, at 209, 221-32, and
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a sword that appellate judges wear but seldom actually draw. The infrequency
of its use is the basis of the conclusion that juries presumptively apply the law to
the facts on questions going to the merits. Thus, the initial answer to any judge/
jury allocation question is that a mixed question is for the jury unless precedent
or the kind of considerations set forth below strongly justify its classification as a
question of law.
265
2. Jurisdictional and Constitutional Facts
Another historical justification for free review of ultimate facts is the doc-
trine of jurisdictional fact. This doctrine appeared first in England in the seven-
teenth century.266 At that time claims that agencies or equivalent executive
officials had exceeded their statutory jurisdiction were virtually immune from
judicial review. 267 To permit such review, the doctrine of jurisdictional fact was
developed. 268 At first limited, the doctrine was almost immediately expanded to
include some ultimate facts that went as much to the merits as to the question of
the agency's jurisdiction to act.2 69 Its raison d'e'tre vanished once judicial review
of administrative action became commonplace, 270 but it survived by evolving
into an excuse for free judicial review of some of these same questions. 27' In this
form jurisdictional fact reached its zenith in America in the early twentieth cen-
tury in a series of famous United States Supreme Court cases, particularly Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,272 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 2 7 3 Crowell v.
who discusses at length the early English cases that withdrew from juries the power to construe
writings. Id. at 203-06. Weiner discusses the wide split of authority in commercial law cases, partic-
ularly over whether the judge or jury will determine the reasonableness or timeliness of commercial
conduct. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1896-1906. Judge Schwarzer cites a number of recent federal
cases in which he asserts mixed questions have been classified as questions of law on undisputed
facts, but some of these cases appear to involve supervisory rulings rather than classifications.
Schwarzer, supra note 137, at 472; see infra note 296. Moreover, the expanded use of the classifica-
tion power in cases involving undisputed facts is questionable. See supra note 73. There are signs of
atrophy in the relative paucity of new law classifications, in the strength of the presumption that law-
applying questions are for the fact finder, and in modem cases like Dobson v. Masonite Corp., 359
F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1966), in which the court said, albeit in the context of construing an oral contract,
that "interpretation of the agreement between the parties to determine what they meant by the terms
of that agreement. . . is always a question of fact." Id. at 923; see also Monaghan, supra note 3, at
232 n.21 (discussing the conflict between older authorities characterizing contract interpretation as a
question of law and newer authorities characterizing it as a question of fact).
265. See infra Part IV C 3.
266. L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 624-33.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 625-26.
269. Id. at 629-33; Monaghan, supra note 3, at 249. Thus, the term "jurisdictional fact" was not
strictly limited to questions of subject matter or personal jurisdiction but potentially included any
crucial fact going to the merits. For example, a compensation statute applicable to employees in-
jured on the navigable waters of the United States was construed to contain two jurisdictional facts:
whether the claimant was an employee and whether he or she was injured upon navigable waters.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The latter question clearly is "jurisdictional." The former,
however, obviously also implicates the merits.
270. L. JAFE, supra note 3, at 634-35.
271. Id.
272. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
273. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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Benson,274 and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States. 275 In these cases,
however, all of which involved constitutional questions or considerations 276 aris-
ing out of judicial review of administrative, statutorily defined findings of ulti-
mate fact, the jurisdictional fact doctrine in effect transformed itself into the
doctrine of constitutional fact. Indeed, to the extent the concepts of constitu-
tional and jurisdictional fact can be distinguished, the former is alive and well
today,277 whereas in the federal courts at least, the latter is effectively gone, if
not forgotten.
278
The doctrine of constitutional fact applies to ultimate facts-and, if neces-
sary, to their underlying historical facts 279-that are fundamental to, or condi-
tions precedent of, constitutional rights.280 It is not limited to administrative
determinations, as was its jurisdictional fact precursor,28' but includes the find-
274. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
275. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
276. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. at 289, and St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 46-49, involved
allegations that public utility rate orders were so low that they amounted to confiscation of property
without due process of law. Ng Fung Ho, 285 U.S. at 284-85, involved a deportation proceeding
against an alleged alien who claimed he was an American citizen entitled to the full protection of due
process. Crowell, which arose out of a federal workers' compensation scheme based on the admi.
ralty power, concerned two separate jurisdictional facts: whether the accident occurred on the navi-
gable waters of the United States and thus within the admiralty power and whether the injured
claimant was an employee, an erroneous affirmative finding which allegedly deprived the employer
of property without due process of law. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54-56; L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 640-
43. Professor Jaffe concludes that
all of the cases dealt with a claim that a constitutional limit has been transgressed and they
reduce to the premise that the judicial function vested in the courts by Article III encom-
passes a power-perhaps a duty-to determine de novo the relevant facts in all cases in-
volving constitutional limits.
Id. at 643.
277. Strong, Persistent Doctrine, supra note 15, at 240-79.
278. Almost any important ultimate fact going to the merits can be "jurisdictional" if it is statu-
torily derived, or "constitutional" if it is constitutionally derived. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson:
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. L.
REv. 1055, 1077-82 (1932). Both designations are possible in the same case if the statutory limit or
requirement is derived from or parallels a constitutional one, such as the interstate commerce re-
quirement of many federal statutes or the navigable waters requirement of Crowell. See supra note
276. In the rate-making cases like Ben Avon Borough and St. Joseph Stock Yards the constitutional
fact was the egregious undervaluation of the utility's property amounting to an unconstitutional
taking of property without due process of law. In recent years, federal courts have declined to label
statutory questions "jurisdictional" or allegedly egregious results as "confiscatory." Thus, it has
been suggested that Ben Avon Borough and St. Joseph Stock Yards are "going, going, almost gone,"
even though they have never been specifically overruled. Davis, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action: A Review, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 635, 671 (1966). The employment issue in Crowell also might
fit this trend. See supra note 276. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 9, at 294-
96.
279. See supra notes 44 & 46.
280. In Crowell the Court spoke of facts whose "existence is a condition precedent to the opera-
tion of a statutory scheme." 285 U.S. at 54. Professor Strong speaks of "facts decisive of constitu-
tional issues." Strong, Persistent Doctrine, supra note 15, at 223.
281. Strong, Persistent Doctrine, supra note 15, at 223. Crowell also suggested that administra-
tively determined jurisdictional facts had to be tried de novo by the reviewing courts, lest the legisla-
tion creating the agency be regarded as an invasion of the judicial power. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54-55,
56-57; Monaghan, supra note 3, at 254-59. Thereafter, as the Court's fear of administrative adjudi-
cation receded, it began to back away from this foolish position, which effectively was put to rest in
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 48-49 (1951). See Strong, Persistent




ings of juries2 82 and trial judges.283 Because many constitutional facts are deter-
minative of procedural or evidentiary rights, 2 84 they could be subject to free
appellate review on that basis alone.285 The remaining constitutional facts af-
fecting the merits are relatively few in number and arise principally out of free
speech problems like libel and obscenity286 and equal protection questions like
discrimination and political representation.
2 87
It could be argued that the doctrine of constitutional fact is constitutionally
required and should not, therefore, be included in discussions of the ways courts
and legislatures choose to divide responsibility between the trial and the appel-
late levels.2 88 This doctrine, which grew out of the policy-based doctrine of ju-
risdictional fact, is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution and must be
implied from its whole text.289 Moreover, because its full scope is debatable,
290
its underlying purposes are matters of legitimate inquiry. Thus, even if the doc-
trine were ultimately found to be constitutionally required, its existence and
scope would be defined in large part by policy considerations. Finally, even its
existence is arguably not constitutionally mandated. Constitutional rights are
obviously at risk when their application to a given set of facts is determined by
fact finders whose decisions receive deferential review. In our legal system, how-
ever, any exercise of fact finder discretion is already subject to the law-declaring
and supervisory powers of the appellate courts.2 9 1 Consequently, fact finder dis-
cretion is not a general threat to the existence of constitutional rights, and the
free review of its exercise is hardly a matter of absolute necessity. That does not
preclude the judgment that constitutional rights are still too important to be left
282. The free review of any jury determination other than one involving a constitutional fact
could amount to an unconstitutional reexamination of the jury's finding in violation of the seventh
amendment. See supra note 19.
283. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
284. Most of these are questions of criminal procedure involving the right to counsel, coerced
confessions, illegal search and seizure, and arrest procedures. Strong, Persistent Doctrine, supra note
15, at 244-61.
285. See infra text accompanying notes 345-51 for a discussion of the appellate treatment of such
important procedural/evidentiary questions.
286. Strong, Persistent Doctrine, supra note 15, at 261-83.
287. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
opened up vast areas of substantive constitutional fact litigation. Cases arising under Brown have
since been brought under the civil rights acts, and but for the extension of the "one man, one vote"
requirement of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to local governments, Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), there still might be unending litigation under Baker.
288. Implicit in Professor Strong's articles and in many of the Supreme Court's opinions, eg.,
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (1984), is the
assumption that the doctrine of constitutional fact is constitutionally mandated. Strong, Persistent
Doctrine, supra note 15, at 223-24. In a recently published article Professor Monaghan argues that
constitutional fact review is a matter of judicial choice, and in support of that conclusion he presents
in greater detail many of the same arguments presented here. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 264-71.
Professor Monaghan's position means that Congress by statute could abrogate the doctrine of consti-
tutional fact in its entirety, a result I am reluctant to endorse. For my purposes it is enough that
there is a substantial policy component to the doctrine's scope, even though its core might be consti-
tutionally mandated.
289. See infra text following note 290.
290. See supra notes 279-81; see also Monaghan, supra note 3, at 244-47, 265-66 (suggesting that
there is no clear basis for deciding what is and what is not a constitutional fact).
291. See infra notes 336-43 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of appellate courts'
discretion).
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to the discretion of fact finders. That judgment, however, is as much a policy
choice as a constitutional one, reflecting the following reasoning offered by Pro-
fessor Jaffe:
Our ultimate aim is to provide a reasoned assurance of the existence of
the crucial facts upon which the exercise of power is to be conditioned.
The now-standard scope of review applied to a finding based on decent
administrative procedure will ordinarily provide that assurance. This
conclusion does not exclude a judgment that in a given case we may
want even greater assurance. In a criminal case, for example, we are
not satisfied with the ordinary degree of proof. This drive for uniform-
ity in administrative law should not force it into a straight jacket. If
ineluctable theory does not demand that certain facts be given excep-
tional procedural handling, neither does it exclude it; and when we
want extra assurance, we should not forfeit it for doctrinal purity.
2 92
Although these remarks addressed only administratively determined consti-
tutional or jurisdictional facts, they are equally applicable to judicial proceedings
and to those so-called questions of "law" that are similarly given "exceptional
procedural handling." The problem is to determine which ultimate facts are so
exceptional that they require exceptional handling and what are the underlying
considerations in making that classification.
3. Factors Affecting the Exercise of the Classification Power
Free review of ultimate facts in effect permits an appellate court to seize for
itself the power to decide the merits in close cases. Such power must tempt
appellate courts. Its exercise, however, is a disruptive, time consuming, and po-
tentially unconstitutional departure from normal practice and of necessity must
be restricted to those ultimate facts whose outcome somehow is too important to
be left to the discretion of fact finders or upon which the abilities, judgment, or
fairness of fact finders is suspect. Not surprisingly, many familiar uses of free
review through the vehicle of classification seem to reflect the latter considera-
tions. Thus, the legal profession's fear of jurors and their tendency to render a
rough cut, ad hoc, and therefore uncertain brand of justice helps to explain why
the interpretation of written contracts and the application of many commercial
law standards to the facts have traditionally been classified as questions of
law. 293 A similar mistrust of local decision makers helps to explain why the
United States Supreme Court so assiduously reviews constitutional fact determi-
nations that a book or film is obscene, that a confession was not coerced, or that
a search or seizure was reasonable.294 Finally, a fear of local interest may be one
of the reasons the Supreme Court is once again in the business of reviewing state
292. L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 635.
293. See supra note 264. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) makes the unconscionability defense a question
of law, presumably not only to achieve whatever certainty and predictability is possible, see LefF,
Unconscionability And The Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 515-16
(1967), but also to eliminate fact finder discretion over this potentially open-ended defense.
294. E.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1967) (per curiam) (reversing a case involv-
ing a "shocking display of barbarism" in procuring a coerced confession approved by the Florida
courts without opinion); accord Monaghan, supra note 3, at 272-73.
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court assertions of personal jurisdiction.295
Some authorities argue that a jury's mere unfamiliarity with various techni-
cal ultimate facts is itself a justification for the legal classification of such mixed
questions. One proponent of this view, Judge Schwarzer of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, cites with approval a number of federal
cases that classify as "legal" mixed questions involving the application of
"predominantly legal standards"-primarily derived from highly technical and
complex statutes-to undisputed historical facts.2 96 The judicial inclination to
take from jurors technical mixed questions generally beyond their common ex-
perience is understandable, but it is opposed by several weighty considera-
tions.297 These include the virtually settled rule that mixed questions cannot be
taken from the jury simply because the historical facts are not in dispute,298 the
difficulties involved in implementing such an ad hoc approach to the judge/jury
problem, 299 and the possible limits imposed by the seventh amendment on such
a broad exercise of the classification power.3° ° Indeed, any approach based
solely on the relative fact-finding abilities of judges and jurors renders almost
unnecessary and meaningless the current controversy concerning whether the
seventh amendment or the due process clause permits a complexity exception to
the right of trial by jury.30 1 For these reasons, the narrower, more cautious
approach that courts presently seem to follow in classifying technical mixed
questions, which allows consideration of, but does not make decisive, the techni-
cal nature of the ultimate fact under consideration, is preferable.
In addition to correcting for trial level bias, interest, or relative incompe-
tence, free appellate review permits the correction of wrong, though reasonable,
determinations through substitution of the appellate court's judgment for that of
the trial level decision maker. Only free review permits appellate courts to per-
form this substitution of judgment; an appellate court may not substitute its
judgment in reviewing facts or any other discretionary determination. At one
295. Louis, supra note 250, at 407-09, 431-32.
296. Schwarzer, supra note 137, at 472-73. The cases cited by Judge Schwarzer involve mostly
technical mixed questions created by federal securities, antitrust, patent, and copyright laws, and
technical common-law or constitutional matters like defamation and employee restrictive covenants.
Few, however, unequivocally state that such technical questions are never for the jury. For example,
Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1982), cited in Schwarzer,
supra note 137, at 472 n.30, and A. A. Hoehling v. Universal Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.
1980), cited in Schwarzer, supra note 137, at 473 n.36, affirm grants of summary judgment for de-
fendants and arguably hold only that on the undisputed facts no reasonable fact finder could have
found for plaintiff. That is a supervisory holding rather than a "law" classification. See supra text
accompanying notes 176-82.
297. Judge Schwarzer totally ignores these opposing considerations. See Schwarzer, supra note
137, at 472-73.
298. See supra note 73.
299. See supra note 138. In private treble damage actions under the antitrust laws, the jury
determines whether defendant's conduct amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade, Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959), even though the issue is often technical and
beyond the experience of the average juror and even though the underlying historical facts some-
times are not in dispute. It is difficult to distinguish this ultimate fact, which creates a jury question,
from other technical ultimate facts, which some courts might classify as questions of law under an ad
hoc approach.
300. See supra note 19.
301. Id.
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time, to guard against the possibility that trial courts would reach wrong-but-
reasonable results, property rights were included in the doctrines of jurisdic-
tional and constitutional fact.3 0 2 More recently, despite the difficulty of distin-
guishing property rights from personal liberties, only the latter have been
included in the surviving doctrine of constitutional fact. 30 3 To justify this spe-
cial protection for personal liberty, Justice Brandeis observed in Ng Fung Ho v.
White3°4 that "to deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives
him of liberty. . . . It may also result in loss of both property and life; or of all
that makes life worth living." °30 5 A wrongful criminal conviction or the discrimi-
natory treatment of persons or whole groups may also result in such a funda-
mental loss. By contrast, an administrative agency's mistake in fixing utility
rates or in finding that an employment relationship exists for compensation pur-
poses ordinarily results only in a loss of money, which in some cases can be
made up the next year by higher rates or other financial adjustments. Thus,
adjudicative mistakes involving personal liberties will often have a harsh or ir-
remedial impact, the avoidance of which clearly is a major reason for free
review.
Although the protection of property rights is no longer a general source of
constitutional fact classifications, 30 6 it remains one of the principal sources of
the law classification. Thus, many mixed common-law questions traditionally
classified as legal involve contractual, commercial, and other property mat-
302. See supra note 276. Many of the early "property" cases in which the doctrines of jurisdic-
tional or constitutional fact were invoked were based in part on the arguably strained constitutional
theory that if the limits of administrative discretion to fix rates or award workers' compensation
were blatantly exceeded, the resulting abuse amounted to an unlawful or confiscatory taking of prop-
erty without due process of law. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1942); see
cases cited and described supra note 276. This "taking" analysis coincidentally gave the Supreme
Court both subject matter jurisdiction and free review. Several factors suggested that free review of
administrative "property" cases was unnecessary. First, because the taking analysis was potentially
applicable to any substantial administrative assault on private pocketbooks, it challenged the whole
idea of administrative adjudicatory discretion. See supra note 278; see also Gudmundson v. Cardillo,
126 F.2d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (suggesting that almost any statutorily based ultimate fact going
to the merits could be classified as a jurisdictional fact). Second, in the few cases in which agencies
rendered results egregious enough to raise due process concerns, reviewing courts could correct the
errors through the law-declaring and supervisory powers. Moreover, even if all judicial remedies
were unavailing, the typically powerful litigants to agency adjudications had political alternatives.
Thus, including these kinds of ultimate facts within the doctrine of constitutional or jurisdictional
fact was hardly essential to protect property rights and amounted to a judicial effort to cow the then
burgeoning and mistrusted administrative process.
303. Strong, Persistent Doctrine, supra note 15, at 242. Some of the possible reasons for generally
excluding property rights from the doctrine of constitutional fact are the rejection of substantive due
process notions, the growing acceptance of administrative adjudication and the accompanying di-
minishing fear of egregious agency results amounting to a confiscation of property, the Warren
Court's greater concern with personal liberties, the likelihood that substantial property owners nor-
mally can protect their own interests, and the numbers of property cases that might come before the
Supreme Court.
304. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
305. Id. at 284-85 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298
U.S. at 77, Justice Brandeis distinguished NgFung Ho by stressing the distinction "between the right
of liberty of person and other constitutional rights."
306. Some property rights, however, still do receive general constitutional fact protection. E.g.,
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (what constitutes a typical taking




ters.30 7 A recent example is found in Hardy v. Toler,30 8 in which the court held
that the determination for treble damage purposes that an act was "unfair" or
"deceptive" within the meaning of the North Carolina version of the Federal
Trade Commission Act 3 0 9 was always a "question of law" for the judges.
310
The opinion offered no policy justifications for this classification, 31 1 but one is
apparent. The statute's language is so broad and vague that the federal version
of the Act provided only for administrative enforcement and primarily for in-
junctive remedies. 312 North Carolina's version, however, includes a private
treble damage remedy.3 13 Arguably, the North Carolina Supreme Court took
the crucial determination from the jury to control this remedial menace to the
pocketbooks of local businesses, many of which doubtlessly were unaware of the
Act's full scope, and to achieve consistency in results. Perhaps the court should
first have tried to narrow the jury's discretion, but the Act's broad language
would have made this kind of control difficult.
Some mixed questions are appropriate for law or constitutional fact classifi-
cation because their incorrect determination may affect similar conduct unre-
lated to the litigation. Thus, free review through the doctrine of constitutional
fact of questions arising out of police searches, seizures, and interrogations
is designed to deter illegal police conduct.31 4 Similarly, free review of constitu-
tional fact questions arising out of the exercise of first amendment rights-
whether a book is obscene315 or a libel was motivated by actual malice3 16 -is
designed to avoid the chilling effects of even occasional wrong decisions on the
general public's exercise of these important rights. The law classification has
also been utilized to avoid such chilling effects. Some states hold that the judge,
rather than the jury, must decide the ultimate fact whether a defendant charged
with malicious prosecution had reasonable and probable cause to believe that the
plaintiff had committed a crime. This law classification was undoubtedly
founded on the belief that juries might be more sympathetic to the innocent
plaintiff than to the public need for information about crime and would often
incorrectly find a lack of reasonable and probable cause, thereby deterring per-
307. See supra notes 258 & 264.
308. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975). For additional discussion of this case, see supra notes
173-75.
309. The state statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981), was derived from § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(a)(1) (1982).
310. Hardy, 288 N.C. at 308-09, 218 S.E.2d at 345-46.
311. The court purported to rely on authority from other jurisdictions, but all the cases cited
were clearly distinguishable. See supra note 173.
312. The extremely broad scope of this language is considered in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). On the enforcement of the federal Act, see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN,
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROcEss 245 (2d ed. 1979).
313. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1983).
314. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (articulating
the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained through searches and seizures that violate the
fourth and fourteenth amendments).
315. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 119 (1960).
316. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1011 (1967).
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sons with such information from contacting the police.
317
A question of law is subject to the doctrine of stare decisis and is legally
binding in like future cases. The predictability and consistency engendered by a
declaration of law encourages certain conduct just as a lack of predictability and
consistency chills it. The desire to encourage certain conduct explains why there
are so many law classifications in the area of land titles, contracts, and commer-
cial law, where finality and certainty are vital.
318
Some ultimate facts that have a constitutional nexus and that in theory
could be regarded as constitutional facts are not so classified, apparently because
the Supreme Court does not feel that free review of these facts is essential. For
example, many federal statutes require that an act or omission occur on naviga-
ble water 319 or be in or affect interstate commerce.320 These statutory require-
ments are not classified as constitutional facts, 321 even though the navigable
waters requirement was once classified as a jurisdictional fact, 322 and even
though both requirements often mirror the equivalent constitutional provi-
sions.323 The federal trial judges and administrators who normally find these
ultimate facts generally are not regarded as untrustworthy, and an occasional
wrong, though reasonable, finding does not seriously threaten federalism. More-
over, these determinations are generally fact specific and readily distinguishable.
Free review, therefore, would not contribute much to consistency or predictabil-
317. Weiner, supra note 2, at 1910-16.
318. Id. at 1904; accord Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision III, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 956-
57 (1923) (contrasting the more certain law of property, contracts, and commercial relations with
the law of torts, fraud, and fiduciary relations, in which general standards, particularized results, and
discretionary authority are more often the dominant legal approach).
319. E.g., Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (Extension) 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1982) ("a vessel on navigable
water").
320. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982) ("[u]nfair methods of com-
petition in or affecting commerce").
321. A majority of FELA cases hold that whether a railroad worker was killed or injured in
interstate commerce is a jury question. New York Cent. R.R. v. Marcone, 281 U.S. 345 (1930);
Southern R.R. v. Lloyd, 239 U.S. 496 (1916). Some courts have held, however, that when the histor-
ical facts are not in dispute, the determination that the act occurred in interstate commerce is a
question of law. Zinsky v. New York Cent. R.R., 36 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Ermin v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 36 F. Supp. 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). These cases, however, are based on the questiona-
ble proposition that a court may expropriate the jury's law-applying function whenever the historical
facts are not in issue. See supra note 73. In antitrust cases under the Sherman Act, the federal
courts seem unable to decide whether the commerce question is for the jury. See, ag., United States
v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1977) (question for jury); Rasmussen v. American Dairy
Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 526 n.16 (9th Cir. 1972) (leaving open the extent to which commerce question
is for judge or jury), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v.
United States, 210 F.2d 732, 746-49 (9th Cir.) (question for jury), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1954);
United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 242 F. Supp 794, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (ques-
tion for jury), aff'd, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966). These statutory cases
must be distinguished from those setting constitutional limits to state encroachments on the com-
merce and admiralty powers, which limits are treated as constitutional facts. E.g., Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
322. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-55, 56-57 (1932). Although lower federal courts
still follow Crowell in cases under the Longshoreman's Act involving Crowell's exact facts, Crowell
apparently otherwise is ignored. Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v, Benson Still Walk?, 98 U.
PA. L. REV. 163, 182 (1949); see Associated Indem. Corp. v. Shea, 455 F.2d 913, 914 n.2 (5th Cir.
1972).




ity of results. Like other fact specific ultimate facts going to the merits, these
ultimate facts are better left to the discretion of fact finders and, when necessary,
to appellate correction through the supervisory and law-declaring powers.
324
Another reason for limiting the number of constitutional fact classifications
is the burden this would place on the docket of the United States Supreme
Court. In this century the Court has greatly expanded the reach of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment and in the process has substantially in-
creased the potential number of constitutional facts and cases raising constitu-
tional fact issues on appeal. 325 Free review of all constitutional fact
determinations, because such review requires a more careful examination of the
whole record, could have overwhelmed the Court or stolen precious time from
its paramount role as the oracle of constitutional and federal law.326 Conse-
quently, the Court had to find ways to reduce the potential burden. One way
was to ignore the colorable constitutional fact status of certain questions, at least
in their less important manifestations. 327 A second way was to treat cases rais-
ing constitutional fact issues, if possible, as falling within the Court's discretion-
ary, certiorari jurisdiction and to deny certiorari in many of them.328 A final
way was to fashion new, more detailed rules of substantive law, narrowing the
discretionary scope of the trial level determination and helping to characterize
particular results as clearly right or wrong. In recent years the Court has em-
ployed the last method in a number of important constitutional areas, including
reapportionment, 329 police arrest and interrogation procedures, 330 and limita-
324. In cases determining the applicability of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1982), however, the Supreme Court will freely
review a determination that a facility is not in commerce. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
In such cases, however, the class impact of the wrongful decision, and the possibility of trial level
bias in reaching it, is very high.
325. See Strong, Dilemmic Aspects, supra note 15, at 325 -33.
326. Id.; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 81-82 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Interstate Cir-
cuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); accord
Monaghan, supra note 3, at 246-47.
327. Arguably, this has been the result in federal cases in which an occurrence on navigable
waters or in interstate commerce is an essential element of a federal statutory claim. See supra notes
319-20 and accompanying text.
328. In Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921), the Court held that an
appeal of right lies under what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982), even if the challenge is only to the
state statute as applied. That has meant, as Justice Brandeis wisely opined in dissent, "the right to a
review will depend, in large classes of cases, not upon the nature of the constitutional question
involved, but upon the skill of counsel." Dahnke- Walker, 257 U.S. at 298. Furthermore, the Court
has been unwilling to excuse those who might have attacked the validity of the statute as applied.
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 650-51 (1942) ("It is not enough that an appel-
lant could have launched his attack on the validity of the statute itself, if he has failed to do so we are
without jurisdiction over the appeal."). The impact of all this is predictable. For example, although
most contemporary constitutional challenges to an assertion of state judicial jurisdiction involve
attacks on a long-arm statute as applied, few such cases reach the United States Supreme Court on
appeal because defendants generally fail to challenge the jurisdictional assertion in these specific
terms. Instead, defendants usually plead only that the court's assertion of jurisdiction exceeds the
limits of due process, an assertion which invokes only the Court's certiorari jurisdiction. Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 90 n.4 (1978). As a result, from 1958 to 1977 the Supreme Court did
not decide a single long-arm case; it consistently denied certiorari. Louis, supra note 250, at 408-09.
329. Professor Strong suggests that the "one man, one vote" rule of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964), and its extension to local governments in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968),
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tions on state judicial jurisdiction. 331 It is a dangerous approach, however, be-
cause the detailed rules chosen could prove too rigid. The alternative for the
Court, however, is a Hobson's choice between ignoring constitutionally offensive
results rendered by trial level decision makers or hearing a flood of fact specific,
supervisory appeals.
V. PROCEDURAL/EVIDENTIARY QUESTIONS
In deciding procedural and evidentiary questions (hereinafter referred to as
procedural questions), trial judges and agencies, but never juries, find historical
facts, declare the law, and apply it to the historical facts found. As with ques-
tions going to the merits, the facts found are ordinarily subject to a narrow scope
of review, the law declared to a free or independent review, and mixed facts to
one or the other.332 Those mixed facts that are freely reviewed are called "ques-
tions of law"; those that are narrowly reviewed are called "discretionary"
333
rather than questions of fact, and there is no implied presumption, as with ques-
tions going to the merits, that narrow review of mixed questions is preferred.
334
Instead, the choice between discretion and law is made ad hoc for every type of
mixed question, ordinarily without explanation but apparently on the basis of
several relevant factors.
Before examining the factors that shape this choice, a few general points
bear emphasis. Discretion is the power to make choices among legally permissi-
reflected the Court's wise reluctance to decide an endless number of reapportionment cases on the
basis of some more general standard. Strong, Dilemmic Aspects, supra note 15, at 327-32.
330. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
331. Louis, supra note 250, at 431-32.
332. E.g., Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1962) (reviewing finding of plaintiff's
citizenship for diversity purposes).
333. Id. Courts employ different terminology to describe the narrow scope of review applicable
to procedural discretion. Thus, although ultimate fact-findings going to the merits are reviewable for
reasonableness or rational bases, discretionary procedural determinations are reviewable for "abuse"
or "manifest abuse" of discretion. See, eg., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (denial of
leave to amend without disclosing a reason is a presumptive abuse of discretion). Moreover, because
appellate cases finding an abuse of discretion are comparatively rare, see Louis, supra note 35, at 836-
38, arguably this narrow scope of review traditionally was somewhat narrower than that for ques-
tions going to the merits, even though it is difficult to articulate the difference. See supra text accom-
panying notes 34-39. Discretionary determinations are also freely reviewable for errors of law,
which include the use of an incorrect legal standard in making the discretionary determination,
Robbins v. Jordan, 181 F.2d 793, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (the trial court erred in holding that delay
of party seeking leave to amend was automatically fatal without regard to whether the delay
prejudiced the opposing party or postponed the trial), the failure to disclose a reason for denying a
discretionary application, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (denial of leave to amend with-
out disclosing a reason is a presumptive abuse of discretion), and a failure to exercise discretion when
appropriate, Murray v. Benson Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 642, 131 S.E.2d 367, 371 (1963) (dis-
missal of action after demurrer sustained without giving plaintiff opportunity to seek leave to amend
is error of law).
334. The percentage of procedural/evidentiary determinations that are freely reviewed is appar-
ently much higher than the very small percentage of equivalent determinations going to the merits.
Indeed, as the discussion below will show, for those procedural determinations that affect outcome
and do not involve subjective considerations, the percentage subject to free review is so high as to




ble, sometimes even conflicting, answers. 335 There are two kinds of discretion:
a primary or strong kind, which is largely unreviewable, and a secondary or
weaker kind, which is subject to a limited or narrow review. 336 Executive or
prosecutorial discretion to investigate or to initiate legal proceedings, for exam-
ple, is ordinarily primary; 337 adjudicative discretion, with which this discussion
is principally concerned, is ordinarily secondary.
338
There are also gradations of secondary discretion. 339 Trial judges, for ex-
ample, have an almost unreviewable discretionary power under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 49(a) to grant or deny a party's request to require the jury to
render a special verdict, 34° but they have a much narrower discretionary power
under Rule 15(a) to deny leave to amend.34 1 Perhaps the use of special verdicts
is inherently less amenable to governance by appellate courts than is the grant or
denial of leave to amend. That the trial level had almost unreviewable discre-
tionary power over leave to amend a half century ago, however, suggests that
there is more to the narrower discretion currently accorded leave to amend deci-
sions than its amenability to appellate court governance indicates. Dissatisfac-
tion with the results of the trial level's exercise of this power over leave to
amend, particularly with the often unexplained and seemingly unjust denial of
such leave, led to particularized rules favoring the grant of leave to amend and
condemning its unexplained denial and to more aggressive appellate supervision
of the power's exercise.342 Future dissatisfaction with the trial court's exercise
of discretionary power over the use of special verdicts could presumably provoke
a similar appellate response, 343 despite the unamenability of the question to ap-
pellate governance.
344
335. As one commentator has noted:
To say that a court has discretion in a given area of the law is to say that it is not bound to
decide the question one way rather than another. In this sense, the term suggests that there
is no wrong answer to the questions posed-at least there is no officially wrong answer.
Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 636-37. Arguably, a court or other decision maker has discretion if
there are at least two officially right answers, even though there are also legally wrong answers.
336. Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 636-37. The Administrative Procedure Act similarly distin-
guishes between "agency action. . . committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(1982) (the primary kind), and "agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 706(2)(A)(1977) (the secondary kind).
337. Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 644-45.
338. Id. at 637.
339. Id. at 650-53.
340. Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 66-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816
(1948).
341. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
342. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) states a presumption in favor of leave to amend. In furtherance of
this presumption, the United States Supreme Court held in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962), that an "outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the
denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion."
343. Appellate courts might hold that, absent a good reason to the contrary, a trial court should
grant a request for a special verdict to avoid potential jury confusion, see United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966), or to make possible the clear application of collateral estoppel in
subsequent related cases. See, ag., Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1876) (collateral estoppel
assertion rejected because of inability to know which of two claims plaintiff established in a prior
action between the parties).
344. See supra Part IV B.
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As indicated above, the scope of review of procedural mixed facts is not
presumptively narrow as it is with questions going to the merits. The reasons for
this difference are not difficult to discern. Unlike substantive questions, proce-
dural determinations are not subject to the seventh amendment. An appellate
court is also likely to be more expert and reliable in matters of procedure than is
a single trial judge3 45 or agency whose raison d'etre is the acquisition of substan-
tive expertise. The number of pages in the record relevant to procedural rulings
also should ordinarily be fewer than those relevant to determinations going to
the merits. Hence, the time required for free review of procedural questions will
not ordinarily be as great as for substantive ones. Furthermore, because the
number of procedural questions to be classified as discretion or law is much
smaller, and because statutes or rules of procedure already classify many of
them, 346 an ad hoc approach is administratively much easier in the procedural
context. Finally, appellate courts may have resolved, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to keep a heavier hand on procedure to make up for their relatively
weaker grip on the merits; the questions regarding the latter have always been a
partial captive of procedure anyway.
347
Although determinations going to the merits are seldom subject to free re-
view, even though they ordinarily affect the outcome of cases, procedural ques-
tions that affect or determine the outcome of cases are usually classified as
questions of law.348 Thus, the grant of almost any motion going to the merits,
which grant would ordinarily conclude the case-for example, motions for sum-
mary judgment or dismissal-is subject to free review.3 49 By contrast, the de-
nial of such a motion for the purpose of giving the opposing party another
chance is discretionary, 350 but in that case the losing party on the motion may
345. Professor Rosenberg has aptly described the concern for the lack of reliability in determina-
tions of lone decision makers as the "feeling that there is safety in numbers." Rosenberg, supra note
230, at 642.
346. Procedural rules and statutes often specifically say that a power is discretionary. E.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 4(h), 6(b). More often discretion is implied by words such as "the court may," "for good
cause," or "in the interest of justice." Ten sections of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure use the
word "discretion," but thirty others have been found to be discretionary. Rosenberg, supra note
230, at 655. Professor Rosenberg warns, however: "Legislatures and rule-drafters scatter the term
about with cheery casualness. Even the appellate-court opinions are not remarkably helpful or clear,
because they overwork the word or phrase and underwork their opportunity to communicate their
reasons or reasoning." Id. at 653.
347. Long ago Sir Henry Maine observed that "[s]o great is the ascendancy of the Law of Ac-
tions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through the envel-
ope of its technical forms." H. MAINE, DISsERTIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1914).
348. For purposes of the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), all substantive law
questions, but only some procedural ones, are considered outcome determinative. See Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
349. In reviewing grants of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, for summary
judgment, for directed verdict, or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, appellate courts nor-
mally exercise independent judgment. See, eg., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153-61
(1970) (summary judgment); Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1967)
(judgment notwithstanding the verdict); Surrowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966)
(motion to dismiss).
350. For example, in its discretion a court may deny or delay summary judgment under FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(f), order a new trial in lieu of directing entry of judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b),
or specify in an order for dismissal under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) that it does not operate as an
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still prevail at the subsequent or new trial. Despite these justifications for in-
dependent review of procedural mixed questions, many such questions are still
inherently unsuitable for free review and, therefore, for the law classification.
For example, mixed questions concerning requests for extensions of time to file
an answer or to make motions or for court continuances or recesses involve mere
housekeeping choices with insignificant effects on case outcomes. Other mixed
questions are unsuitable because they are quite fact specific, dependent on a
number of variables, or dependent on an intimate "feel" for all the circum-
stances of the case that only a trial level fact finder has. 351 Consequently, such
procedural questions may not be amenable to appellate declaration of specific
legal rules of decision or to the making of independent appellate judgments.
Not even all potentially outcome-affecting procedural determinations are
deemed questions of law. The grant or denial of leave to amend a pleading, for
example, is discretionary, despite the potentially harsh impact of an unreasona-
ble denial thereof.352 Under the common law and the Field Code, amendment
was not a favorite of the judges and often was denied unfairly.35 3 Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15 changed this bias by requiring that "leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires." Although leave to amend remains discretion-
ary, its denial is circumscribed by various rules of decision 354 and is also super-
vised more carefully on appeal.3 55 Thus, the law-declaring and supervisory
powers control this important but essentially discretionary determination.
Although decisions regarding leave to amend are inherently discretionary,
the companion determination that an amendment will relate back to the date of
filing the original pleading is a question of law. 356 This difference in treatment
suggests that additional factors are relevant to the classification of a particular
mixed procedural question as one of law or discretion. A relation back determi-
nation requires the application of a few, easily ascertained historical facts to a
simple statutory standard,357 an exercise in logic, experience, and precedent that
appellate courts can review readily. Leave to amend, however, may involve the
adjudication on the merits. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947) (trial
court's discretion to grant new trial or voluntary dismissal in lieu of judgment notwithstanding the
verdict); Williams v. Howard Johnson's, Inc. 323 F.2d 102, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1963) (discretion to
deny technically apppropriate motion for summary judgment); Safeway Stores v. Fannan, 308 F.2d
94, 99 (9th Cir. 1962) (allowing dismissal without prejudice in the face of a motion for directed
verdict); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Guasti, 68 Ill. App. 3d 484, 487, 386 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1st Dist.
1979) (discretion to set aside default judgment). Such rulings are obviously discretionary because
ordinarily they require inter alia a judgment concerning whether the opposing party's pre-motion
conduct was unworthy of a second chance. See infra note 359. Moreover, the decision on the merits
is postponed rather than concluded.
351. Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 663. For a more particularized discussion of these factors
and their effect on the classification of a procedural question as discretionary, see infra notes 356-60
and accompanying text.
352. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
353. Donnici, The Amendment of Pleadings-A Study of the Operation of Judicial Discretion In
the Federal Courts, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 529 (1964).
354. See supra note 346.
355. E.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
356. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574 (1945); Watts v. State, 115 Ariz. 545, 566
P.2d 693 (1977).
357. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), the question is whether the claim or defense asserted in the
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assessment and balancing of a number of factors or considerations, 3 58 some of
which are subjective and require a special feel for the facts of the case or are
based on critical facts or circumstances imperfectly conveyed by the record.
359
Consequently, free review thereof would often require substantial appellate effort
and the reviewing court would often be at a relative decisional disadvantage to
the trial level decision maker.360 In any event, full review by an appellate court
would produce a fact specific result that could easily be distinguished. For all
these reasons, leave to amend is discretionary, even though the discretion is
more carefully circumscribed today.
Relation back and leave to amend are at relatively opposite points on the
law/discretion spectrum. The former requires a simple, objective determination;
the latter a complex, partially subjective one based on a multitude of factors.
Such opposites may not indicate how to classify closer questions, but they do
reveal why many similarly paradigmatic procedural questions are readily classi-
fied as legal or discretionary.
36 1
amended pleading arose out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading.
In most cases the court need only read the two pleadings to make the determination.
358. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at § 4.13.
359. Id. The court must consider inter alia why the subject matter of the amendment was not
included in the original pleading or offered sooner than it was. The reasons for the omission or delay
run all the way from inadvertence or excusable neglect to affirmative bad faith. Other such dispensa-
tional requests or motions require similar subjective assessments. See Rosenberg, supra note 230, at
663 (discussing discretionary allowances of jury trial after a tardy § request under FED. R. Civ. P.
39(b)). In such cases the court may also consider other incidents in the proceedings bearing on the
moving party's good faith or lack thereof. Cf. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (discretion-
ary dismissal for party's failure to attend pretrial conference properly based in part on party's previ-
ous pattern of using delay tactics).
360. Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 660-63. For other illustrations of discretionary determina-
tions in which the record imperfectly conveys the relevant facts and the appellate court is at a
decisional disadvantage, see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Barrett, 246 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir.
1957) (affirming the trial judge's denial of a motion to vacate a personal injury award for a faked
injury because he had seen plaintiff and the allegedly impeaching motion pictures submitted after the
trial and was not convinced that plaintiff had perpetrated a fraud); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Spen-
cer, 181 Cal. App. 171, 173, 5 Cal. Rptr. 75, 77 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (affirming refusal to grant a
new trial for prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's lawyer in his summation to the jury because the
trial judge had observed the jury and its stable reaction to the attorney's inflammatory harangue);
Schuttler v. Reinhardt, 17 N.J. Super. 480, 484-85, 86 A.2d 438, 440-41 (App. Div. 1952) (on mo-
tion for mistrial the trial judge had a better view of whether a weeping, injured female party improp-
erly appealed to the jury's emotions).
361. Questions classified as legal include the following: Whether evidence is protected by the
work product and attorney-client privileges, Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); whether
there is an adequate showing of good cause to examine a party physically, Schlagenhauf v. Holder,
379 U.S. 104 (1964); whether evidence is hearsay or qualifies under an exception to the hearsay rules,
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285 (1892); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th
Cir. 1976); whether a rule of procedure is outcome determinative for Erie purposes, Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); and whether an act falls within the terms of a
long-arm statute, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961). Among the many discretionary determinations explainable in terms of the distinctions
set forth above are the following listed by Professor Rosenberg:
In proceedings before trial, discretion arises as an issue in connection with changing venue;
granting extensions of time; allowing parties to amend; permitting intervention or im-
pleader; holding pretrial conferences; passing upon a late demand for a jury trial; and a
host of other matters. During the trial, discretion comes into play with regard to the
judge's control of the selection of the jury, the attorney's opening statements, and countless
aspects of trial administration. He decides on the sequence of proof, whether demonstra-
tive evidence may be introduced and whether sensory evidence may be exhibited to the
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Locating the middle ground is of course more difficult. Some authorities
say that a determination is discretionary if the number of relevant considerations
is too numerous to frame workable rules of decision or general legal principles
directing and narrowing the exercise of the discretion. 362 Leave to amend, for
example, involves three basic considerations: whether the party offering the
amendment has been diligent in locating and disclosing the new facts,
363
whether the amendment is particularly important or drastic,364 and whether or
to what extent the new facts will prejudice the opposing party.3 6 5 Although any
one of these considerations might fall on the "legal" side of the spectrum on the
basis of the ease with which it can be reviewed on appeal, it must be compared
with, or balanced against, the other two. This final weighing of nonquantifiable
factors often makes it difficult, if not impossible, to develop general legal princi-
ples wisely guiding and controlling the determination. For this reason a decision
regarding leave to amend must be discretionary. Although predictability and
appellate control are lost, there is a gain in flexibility which is the essence of
discretion:
Flexibility permits more compassionate and more sensitive responses
to differences which ought to count in applying legal norms, but which
get buried in the gross and rounded-off language of rules that are di-
rected at wholesale problems instead of particular disputes. Discretion
in this sense allows the individualization of law and permits justice at
times to be hand-made instead of mass-produced.
366
Multifactored determinations are not per se discretionary, however. Rule
19, which governs necessary and indispensable parties, specifically requires the
assessment and comparison of a number of factors,367 but the final determina-
tion is nonetheless subject to free appellate review. 368 Before the adoption of the
jury. He has discretion, as we have seen, in regard to ordering special verdicts or interroga-
tories. When the occasion arises, he may grant a mistrial, or refuse to do so. He applies
the rules of evidence, at times according to fixed criteria of admissibility, at other times in
his discretion.
Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 657-58. For a discussion of the exercise of discretion in allowing
voluntary dismissals, see Note, Exercise of Discretion in Permitting Dismissals Without Prejudice
Under Federal Rule 41(a), 54 COLUM. L. REv. 616 (1954); Note, Voluntary Dismissals by Order of
Court-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2) and Judicial Discretion, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 446 (1972).
362. In Noonan v. Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1967), Judge Friendly offered the
following reasons for appellate deference to the trial judge's exercise of discretion: "[H]is observa-
tion of the witnesses, his superior opportunity to get the 'feel of the case' .. and the impracticality
offraming a rule of decision where many disparate factors must be weighed.." (emphasis added);
see also Palliser v. Home Tel. Co., 170 Ala. 341, 345, 54 So. 499, 500 (1911) ("A judicial act is said to
lie in discretion when there are no fixed principles by which its correctness may be determined.").
363. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at § 4.11; Donnici, supra note 353, at 535-40.
364. Donnici, supra note 353, at 544-47.
365. Id. at 534. Donnici also suggests another factor-the later an amendment is offered, the
more likely it will be rejected. Id. at 540. That factor, however, may only be a surrogate for other
considerations, e.g., whether the opposing party will be prejudiced or surprised by the amendment or
whether the amendment is offered in bad faith.
366. Rosenberg, supra note 230, at 642.
367. One set of factors determines when a person should be joined, FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); an-
other set determines whether the action may proceed if that party cannot be joined, id. 19(b).
368. Cf Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968) (free review
of ruling that a party is indispensable).
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Federal Rules, there were historical reasons for the free review of this ques-
tion.369 Today, the potentially harsh impact of an incorrect determination
370
and the objective nature of all the factors to be assessed and weighed also sup-
port its free review on appeal. For similar reasons, potentially outcome determi-
native trial level choices of law, which also often require a balancing of objective
factors,37 1 are questions of law.372 By contrast, permissive intervention under
Rule 24(b), another multifactored determination, is by its own terms discretion-
ary. But an incorrect decision regarding permissive intervention, while perhaps
inconvenient to the losing party, is not ordinarily outcome determinative. More-
over, one of the listed statutory factors in Rule 26(b)---"whether the interven-
tion will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties"-may require a special feel for the case and could raise subjective ques-
tions about the motives or diligence of the would-be intervenor.
373
Although a determination such as permissive intervention may be discre-
tionary, assessing one or more of its component factors need not be. Deciding,
for example, under Rule 24(b) whether the "applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common" 3 74 is a straightforward,
objective determination amenable to free review. Analogously, some procedures
like summary judgment and impleader, which are often called discretionary, 375
are mostly legal. Thus, the principal determination on a motion for summary
judgment-whether under Rule 56(c) "there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact"-is subject to free review.376 Admittedly, the trial judge's power
under Rule 56(f) to deny or to delay summary judgment when the opposing
369. Originally, in actions at law the question of indispensability turned on whether the rights
involved were joint or several, an issue that was a question of law. See generally Reed, Compulsory
Joinder in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327 (1957) (discussing the history of compulsory joinder
rules). Equity employed a flexible test much like the one set forth today in FED. R. CIv. P. 19, but
the chancellor's determination was freely reviewed on appeal. Cf. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 13.8, at 679 (2d ed. 1977) (determinations of chancellor, except those involving testi-
monial evidence and considerations of witness credibility, received little or no deference on appeal).
370. A wrongful determination may result in the dismissal of the case or its continuation to the
detriment of one of the parties or of the person who should have been joined. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
Of course the potential for harsh results is not conclusive of the scope of appellate review, as noted in
the example of leave to amend a complaint. See supra notes 363-65 and accompanying text.
Although trial level discretion regarding leave to amend questions is somewhat circumscribed, the
questions nonetheless are classified as discretionary. Id.
371. The choice of law determination normally involves a variety of factors, which include inter
alia the territorial nexus between the acts involved and the forum state, the relationship of the par-
ties to the forum state, and the forum state's interest in applying its law to the transaction or occur-
rence. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 323-24, 546 P.2d 719, 725-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,
221-22, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
372. Id.
373. Eg., Janousek v. Wells, 303 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1962) (untimely application for intervention
rejected under circumstances suggesting that its sole purpose was further delay of the trial).
374. A determination that a permissive joinder of parties is proper, which determination also
requires the presence of common questions of law or fact, is freely reviewable. See Akely v. Kinni-
cutt, 238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682 (1924) (discussing permissive joinder of parties, noting that com-
mon questions of law and fact must be present); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 53, § 1659,
at 317 (discussing generally the discretion of the court in allowing third-party claims).
375. Farmers & Merchants Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pulliam, 481 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1973) (im-
pleader); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970) (sum-
mary judgment); Southern Ry. v. Fox, 339 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1964) (impleader).
376. E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-61 (1970).
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party is unable to present affidavits showing a genuine issue of material fact is
discretionary, 377 but that is a relatively rare antecedent determination, in effect,
a discretionary tail occasionally wagging what is essentially a legal dog. Simi-
larly, a trial court has very little discretion to dismiss a timely378 and proper
third-party complaint. 379 In its discretion the court may order a separate trial
under Rule 42(b) if the third-party action would confuse or prejudice the origi-
nal one,380 but this option is available for every kind of permissive joinder
38 1
and hardly amounts to a discretionary trial level veto power over the basic join-
der right. Once again, the legal nature of the basic question is not changed by
the existence of an antecedent, exceptional discretionary power.
In short, it may be more accurate to divide certain complex procedural
determinations into their component parts and to characterize the scope of re-
view of the parts separately. Such a division has already occurred in some stat-
utes.38 2 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, relevancy, as defined
by Rule 401, is a narrow, objective determination readily subject to free appel-
late review.3 83 Under Rule 403, however, there is a discretionary power to ex-
clude relevant evidence if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence."'38 4 Prior to this statutory division, relevancy, or "legal rele-
vancy" as it sometimes was called, was classified as a discretionary matter,38 5 to
,the confusion of those who failed to recognize the separability of the issues of
relevancy from the issue whether the probative value of relevant evidence was
outweighed by other factors.
Designating a procedural determination as discretionary results in a limited
scope of review on appeal, few reversals, a reduced number of appeals, and,
therefore, trial level hegemony over the question. The designation, however, is
377. Williams v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 323 F.2d 102, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1963).
378. "Timely" means a third-party complaint filed not later than ten days after the service of the
answer. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Thereafter, to file a third-party complaint, defendant must obtain
leave of court, which leave is discretionary.
379. In a personal injury action against an employer for the negligence of its driver, the em-
ployer's third-party complaint against the driver was dismissed because the employer's insurance
policy presumably covered the employee and the third-party action apparently was designed to
evoke a false jury sympathy for the employee. Goodhart v. United States Lines Co., 26 F.R.D. 163
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); accord List v. Roto-Broil Corp., 40 F.R.D. 31 (M.D. Pa. 1966). Even this rare
instance of a discretionary dismissal is questionable because the court could have achieved an
equivalent result by ordering a separate trial under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
380. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 53, § 1443, at 210-15.
381. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 9.1, at 462.
382. The divisions between FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(f) text accompanying have already
been noted. See supra text accompanying notes 376-77. A similar division occurs in FED. R. Civ. P.
20(a) and 20(b). Section (a) sets a legal standard for permissive party joinder; § (b) authorizes a
discretionary separation for trial of parties properly joined under § (a).
383. FED. R. EvID. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. J. THAYER, supra note 138, at 269; Dolan, Rule
403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 267 (1976).
384. FED. R. EvID. 403.
385. This history is discussed in the first edition of C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 152, at 320-21 (1954).
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applied primarily to the less important questions. The more important proce-
dural questions tend to be classified as questions of law. This turnabout from
the merits, in which only a few, supremely important mixed questions are sub-
ject to free review, is understandable,3 86 though arguably somewhat inconsistent
and consumptive of precious appellate time. Fortunately, only a small portion
of all procedural rulings are actually appealed, 387 and most of these are disposed
of by the intermediate appellate courts. Thus, the highest courts may not yet
perceive a need to narrow or restrict the scope of review of these mixed proce-
dural questions to save time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing study shows, perhaps not unexpectedly, that adjudicative au-
thority is divided between the trial and appellate levels along rational, if some-
what random, historically evolving lines and that the principal areas of
contention between the two levels have remained relatively constant. The source
of most contention is the process of law application, which, on questions going
to the merits, is now committed principally to the discretion of the fact finders.
Of the three traditional exceptions to this commitment-constitutional facts, so-
called questions of law, and ultimate fact-findings by trial judges-only the first,
principally for substantive reasons, is flourishing. Finally, although the appel-
late courts could have employed their law-making power to offset their loss in
adjudicative authority, thus far they have failed to do so.
Appellate courts, however, have surrendered none of their traditional au-
thority over trial level procedural and evidentiary determinations. Indeed, in a
few instances they even have foresworn their historical propensity to treat some
discretionary procedural determinations as virtually unreviewable. 3 88 More-
over, appellate courts tend to classify the most important of these determina-
tions-those that could terminate or affect the outcome of the litigation-as
freely reviewable questions of law. Thus, the appellate level has retained the
lion's share of procedural adjudicative authority and shows no inclination to
surrender it. Nevertheless, under the pressure of their swollen dockets the ap-
pellate courts will no doubt be compelled to give shorter shrift to minor or less
hotly contested procedural errors.
The growing demands on the time of appellate judges and their consequent
need to limit their areas of responsibility are the most significant reasons for the
growing shift in power from the appellate courts to trial level decision makers.
This shift in power inevitably will lead to greater uniformity in appellate treat-
386. See supra text accompanying notes 345-47.
387. One reason for this small number of appeals is that many questionable procedural rulings
are annulled by subsequent case developments such as settlement or a jury verdict for the party
aggrieved by the error. Furthermore, attorneys may regard appeals asserting a spate of procedural
errors as unpromising if there also are not substantive law questions. Even if there are substantive
assignments of error, if these assignments fail, the remaining procedural issues sometimes will be
disposed of summarily by general language to the effect that other assertions of error are without
merit.
388. See supra note 36.
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ment of the various fact finders, even though appellate opinions will doubtlessly
continue to recite varying degrees of deference in justification of particular re-
sults. The growing uniformity may finally allow legal scholarship to concentrate
more on the process of adjudication itself than on its separate systems and the
historical and institutional differences among them. Academic attempts to inte-
grate the courses in civfl and criminal procedure and administrative law and to
treat these heretofore separate subjects as facets of a single process reflect this
growing uniformity.3 89 As a result, comparative procedural studies, cross-fertil-
ization among procedural systems, and growing uniformity in approach are a
much greater possibility than before.
389. See, e.g., R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE iii-vi (1979).
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